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Abstract
This thesis develops new methods to assess two types of financial risk. Market
risk is defined as the risk of losing money due to drops in the values of asset portfo-
lios. Systemic risk refers to the breakdown risk for the financial system induced by
the distress of individual companies. During the financial crisis 2007–2009, both
types of risk materialized, resulting in huge losses for investors, companies, and tax
payers all over the world. Therefore, considering new risk management alternatives
is of interest for both financial institutions and regulatory authorities.
A common feature of the models used throughout the thesis is that they adapt
quantile regression techniques to the context of financial risk management in a novel
way. Firstly, to predict extreme market risk, nonparametric quantile regression is
combined with extreme value theory. The resulting extreme Value at Risk (VaR)
forecast framework is applied to different international stock indices. In many situ-
ations, its performance is superior to parametric benchmark models.
Secondly, a systemic risk measure, the realized systemic risk beta, is proposed.
In contrast to exististing measures it is tailored to account for tail risk interconnec-
tions within the financial sector, individual firm characteristics, and financial indica-
tors. To determine each company’s relevant risk drivers, model selection techniques
for high-dimensional quantile regression are employed. The realized systemic risk
beta corresponds to the total effect of each firm’s VaR on the system’s VaR. Using
data on major financial institutions in the U.S. and in Europe, it is shown that the




In dieser Dissertation werden neue Methoden zur Erfassung zweier Risikoarten
entwickelt. Markrisiko ist definiert als das Risiko, auf Grund von Wertrückgän-
gen in Wertpapierportfolios Geld zu verlieren. Systemisches Risiko bezieht sich
auf das Risiko des Zusammenbruchs eines Finanzsystems, das durch die Notlage
eines einzelnen Finanzinstituts entsteht. Im Zuge der Finanzkrise 2007–2009 re-
alisierten sich beide Risiken, was weltweit zu hohen Verlusten für Investoren, Un-
ternehmen und Steuerzahler führte. Vor diesem Hintergrund besteht sowohl bei
Finanzinstituten als auch bei Regulierungsbehörden Interesse an neuen Ansätzen
für das Risikomanagement.
Die Gemeinsamkeit der in dieser Dissertation entwickelten Methoden besteht
darin, dass unterschiedliche Quantilsregressionsansätze in neuartiger Weise für das
Finanzrisikomanagement verwendet werden. Zum einen wird nichtparametrische
Quantilsregression mit Extremwertmethoden kombiniert, um extreme Markpreisän-
derungsrisiken zu prognostizieren. Das resultierende Value at Risk (VaR) Prognose-
Modell für extreme Wahrscheinlichkeiten wird auf internationale Aktienindizes ange-
wandt. In vielen Fällen schneidet es besser ab als parametrische Vergleichsmodelle.
Zum anderen wird ein Maß für systemisches Risiko, das realized systemic risk
beta, eingeführt. Anders als bereits existierende Messgrößen erfasst es explizit
sowohl Risikoabhängigkeiten zwischen Finanzinstituten als auch deren individuelle
Bilanzmerkmale und Finanzsektor-Indikatoren. Um die relevanten Risikotreiber
jedes einzelnen Unternehmens zu bestimmen, werden Modellselektionsverfahren
für hochdimensionale Quantilsregressionen benutzt. Das realized systemic risk beta
entspricht dem totalen Effekt eines Anstiegs des VaR eines Unternehmens auf den
VaR des Finanzsystems. Anhand von us-amerikanischen und europäischen Daten





First of all, I would like to express my gratitude towards my supervisor Niko-
laus Hautsch for his support and guidance throughout the last four years. He gave
me the opportunity to come to Berlin and work in the unique environment of the
Chair of Econometrics and the CRC 649. I also strongly thank my second supervi-
sor Melanie Schienle for her guidance that started with my very first econometrics
seminar as a graduate student. Without our countless discussions, her expert advice,
and her continuous encouragement, this thesis would not have been finished.
Bernd Droge has always had an open door for me. I benefited a lot from his
advice on many aspects of econometrics and statistics. I wish to thank him along
with my former colleagues at the Chair of Econometrics Franziska Lottmann, Jakob
Fiedler, Axel Groß-Klussmann, Jonas Haase, Gustav Haitz, Ruihong Huang, Lada
Kyj, Peter Malec, and Tomas Polak, for the good working atmosphere and the many
discussions on research and beyond.
I am very grateful to Miriam Kaboub for her overviews and help with admin-
istrative matters. Thank you to the student assistants for their commitment and
research support.
Moreover, I wish to thank John Einmahl for supporting my research visit to
Tilburg University. Our many discussions during these three weeks significantly
broadened my knowledge about extreme value statistics.
Carsten Trenkler was my first undergraduate econometrics teacher and has given
me valuable advice and support ever since. Thank you.
Finally, I thank my parents and Niklas for their patience, their unconditional





1 Predicting extreme Value at Risk: Nonparametric quantile regression
with refinements from extreme value theory 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Quantile regression approaches to VaR estimation . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Conditional quantiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Conditional Autoregressive VaR (CAViaR) Models . . . . . 8
1.3 Nonparametric quantile regression and EVT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Double Kernel Local Linear VaR regression . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Refining nonparametric quantile regression with extreme
value theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Data and backtesting method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Application to stock index returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.1 Monotonicity of quantile curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.2 Comparing 1% VaR predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.3 Comparing extreme VaR predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Simulation: Comparing DKLL and EVT-refined VaR estimation . . 27
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Financial Network Systemic Risk Contributions 31
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Measuring systemic relevance in a network . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.1 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.3 A tail risk network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
VII
2.3.1 Measuring firm-specific tail risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.2 Network model and structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Quantifying systemic risk contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.1 Measuring systemic risk betas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.2 Estimation and inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4.3 Empirical evidence on systemic risk betas and risk rankings 53
2.5 Validity: pre-crisis period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.A.1 Econometric methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.A.2 Tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 Forecasting systemic impact in financial networks 79
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2 Forecasting Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.1 Time-Varying Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.2 Forecasting Systemic Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 Data and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Bibliography 105
List of Figures 107
List of Tables 108
VIII
Introduction
If I had better foresight, maybe I could have improved things a little bit.
But frankly, if I had perfect foresight, I would never have taken this job
in the first place.
–Richard F. Syron, former Chief Executive of Freddie Mac
Since the financial crisis 2007–2009, risk management practice has been dis-
cussed controversially. In response to the tremendous losses of investors, firms, and
governments, and therefore societies, all over the world, the Basel Committee for
Banking Supervision introduced a new regulatory framework, known as Basel III,
in 2010, emphasizing that “[the] failure to capture major on- and off-balance sheet
risks, [...] was a key destabilising factor during the crisis” (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2011, p. 2)).
Two important types of financial risk are market risk and systemic risk.1 Market
risk can be described as the risk that a portfolio of assets loses value due to mar-
ket movements. Since 1996, regulation requires banks to report their market risks
on a regular basis, using the so-called Value at Risk (VaR), a loss forecast corre-
sponding to certain time horizon and a certain significance level. In practice, VaR
is estimated via statistical methods, e. g. regressions, simulation, or extreme value
theory. The appropriateness of each of these methods depends on whether the data
meet the respective assumptions. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, we investigate if re-
laxing some common assumptions on distributional and functional forms leads to a
gain in market VaR prediction accuracy.
The financial turmoil taking place in the wake of Lehman Brothers’s bankruptcy
in September 2008 revealed the financial sector’s fragility when confronted with
1Furthermore, there are credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk.
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the default of a key player. This systemic risk, which had been neglected in regula-
tory frameworks before, has since become an active field of research. In Chapters
2 and 3 of this thesis, which are joint work with Nikolaus Hautsch and Melanie
Schienle, we develop and apply a new procedure to quantify systemic risk. In con-
trast to existing measures, the so-called realized systemic risk beta explicitly takes
into account network spillover effects within the financial sector, while also includ-
ing individual companies’s balance sheet information and financial indicators. The
model is estimated using only publicly available data. As Hellwig (2009) points
out, in the crisis, “risks [were] generated by [...] interdependence and by the lack of
transparency about systemic risk exposure” (p. 134). With our model, we are able
address these two problematic issues.
Value at Risk
The risk measure employed throughout the thesis is conditional Value at Risk (VaR).
It is defined as the negative p-quantile qp of the conditional distribution F of random
returns Yt at time point t,
VaRp,t := −qp(Yt|Xt) = − inf {y ∈ R : F(y|Xt) ≥ p} ,
given a vector of covariates Xt. VaR may be interpreted as a loss that, conditional on
Xt, will only be exceeded with small probability p during the time span t to t + 1.
One advantage of VaR is that it summarizes potential losses in a intuitive way.2
Besides being used for internal risk management in financial firms, it has become
a building block for regulatory capital requirements, since the “Amendment to the
Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks” (see Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision (1996, 2006, 2011)). In a much-noticed paper by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber,
and Heath (1999), however, VaR is criticized for not being subadditive in general,
implying that the VaR of a portfolio is not necessarily less or equal to the sum of
VaRs of smaller portfolios that it is split into. Therefore, Artzner et al. (1999) sug-
gest to use Expected Shortfall (ES), the expected loss over a target horizon, given
the VaR is exceeded. In this thesis, we stick to VaR for two reasons. Firstly, even
if ES might be preferable from a theoretical point of view, its estimation still re-
2Jorion (2007) provides a comprehensive introduction to VaR.
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quires the estimation of VaR in a first step. In principle, all methods descibed in
the following chapters may be extended to ES frameworks. Secondly, Danielsson,
Jorgensen, Samorodnitsky, Sarma, and de Vries (2011) show that for a broad class
of continuous distributions with fat tails, VaR is indeed subadditive. Exceptions are
distributions with infinite first moments.3 Since we work with VaR only in the con-
text of distributions of daily returns which are known to possess first moments, this
limitation does not affect our results.
Detailed outline of the thesis
In Chapter 1, a framework is introduced which allows us to apply nonparametric
quantile regression to Value at Risk (VaR) prediction at any probability level of in-
terest. A monotonized double kernel local linear estimator is used to estimate mod-
erate (1%) conditional quantiles of index return distributions. For extreme (0.1%)
quantiles, nonparametric quantile regression is combined with extreme value the-
ory. The abilities of the proposed estimators to capture market risk are investigated
in a VaR prediction study with empirical and simulated data. Possibly due to its
flexibility, the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the new model appears to
be superior to competing models. A version of Chapter 1 is published in Computa-
tional Statistics & Data Analysis, see Schaumburg (2012).
Chapter 2 introduces the realized systemic risk beta as a measure for a finan-
cial company’s contribution to systemic risk given network interdependence be-
tween firms’ tail risk exposures. Conditional on statistically pre-identified network
spillover effects and market and balance sheet information, we define the realized
systemic risk beta as the total time-varying marginal effect of a firm’s VaR on
the system’s VaR. Suitable statistical inference reveals a multitude of relevant risk
spillover channels and determines companies’s systemic importance in the U.S. fi-
nancial system. Our approach can be used for a transparent macroprudential regu-
lation. The chapter is based on Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012a).
In Chapter 3, we extend the framework from Chapter 2, providing a methodol-
ogy for forecasting the systemic impact of financial institutions in interconnected
systems. For five years including the financial crisis, we demonstrate how the
approach can be used for transparent systemic risk monitoring of large European
3In this case, ES is not defined.
3
banks and insurance companies. As measure for systemic impact we predict sys-
temic risk betas which account for a company’s position within the network of fi-
nancial interdependencies in addition to its individual balance sheet characteristics
and its exposure towards market conditions. Relying only on publicly available
market data, we can determine time-varying systemic risk networks, and forecast
systemic importance on a daily frequency and on a quarterly basis. We illustrate
that the interplay of both could serve as a valuable tool for supervisory authorities.
The chapter is based on Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012b).
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Chapter 1
Predicting extreme Value at Risk:
Nonparametric quantile regression
with refinements from extreme value
theory
This chapter is based on Schaumburg (2012).
1.1 Introduction
In bank regulation, the effectiveness of capital requirements in preventing funding shortfalls
rests upon the estimation accuracy of market risk measures, the most widely used of which
is Value at Risk (VaR). According to the Market Risk Amendment to the Basel II Capi-
tal Accord, VaR is to be calculated daily, using a “99th percentile, one-tailed confidence
interval” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005, p. 40)).
Not only against the background of the financial turbulences during the crisis 2007–
2009, there is a practical need for VaR models that are rich enough to capture the dynamics
of quickly changing market environments, while being parsimonious at the same time in or-
der to avoid overfitting. In this context, kernel-based quantile regression is a natural choice:
Being fully nonparametric, the approach does not require any structural assumptions, nei-
ther on the form of the VaR function nor on the shape of the loss distribution. Furthermore,
instead of estimating structural parameters, the primary interest is to predict quantiles ac-
curately. Therefore, we do not lose interpretability by employing nonparametric estimation
5
methods.
Until now, however, nonparametric quantile regression has not been widely used in risk
management practice. One possible reason is that, precisely because no structure is imposed
on the regression function, the speed of convergence is slower than in parametric regression
settings, and generally more observations are needed for accurate estimation. Therefore,
when considering nonparametric quantile regression for VaR prediction, one has to address
the problem of data sparseness at the tails of the loss distribution, which gets more severe
when considering quantiles corresponding to extreme probabilities.
This paper proposes a framework allowing to operationalize nonparametric quantile
regression as a VaR estimation tool for both moderate and extreme probabilities. We include
only past returns as regressors, which is sufficient, as a maximum of information can be
exploited and any kinds of nonlinearities are captured within the modelling approach. In
addition, the model is simple, overfitting is avoided, and problems arising from limited
observations are minimized. A double kernel-type estimator is used to smooth distortions.
Additionally, monotonization by rearrangement is applied at the boundary of the estimated
function. Finally, in order to predict VaR corresponding to extreme probability levels (such
as 0.1%), the peaks over threshold method is incorporated and applied to the standardized
nonparametric quantile residuals, resulting in an estimator that combines nonparametric
quantile regression and extreme value theory (EVT).
Several studies have compared the forecast performances of different VaR models, see,
among others, Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006), Manganelli and Engle (2001) and Ni-
eto and Ruiz (2008). They take a broad variety of models into account, but nonparametric
quantile regression as a tool for VaR estimation is rarely included. There are three excep-
tions we are aware of: Cai and Wang (2008) suggest to estimate VaR and Expected Short-
fall using a new nonparametric VaR estimator, combining the Weighted Nadaraya Watson
(WNW) estimator of Cai (2002) and the Double Kernel Local Linear (DKLL) estimator of
Yu and Jones (1998). In the empirical application, however, only 5% quantile curves are
estimated and no forecasts are computed. Chen and Tang (2005) investigate nonparametric
VaR estimation, when no regressors are present. Taylor (2008) proposes to combine double
kernel quantile regression with exponential smoothing of the dependent variable in the time
domain. 1% and 99% VaRs are predicted from the model along with some benchmarks, but
extreme quantiles are not considered.
In contrast to the studies already available in the literature, we present a method that
allows to nonparametrically estimate VaR corresponding to any probability that might be
of practical interest. We estimate, predict and backtest 1% and 0.1% VaRs for four sets of
index returns and a simulated time series. Our focus is on gains to loosening assumptions
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in comparison to existing VaR models. Therefore, in the empirical application, we choose
to benchmark our model against the most flexible parametric VaR models, the Conditional
Autoregressive Value at Risk (CAViaR) models of Engle and Manganelli (2004). They al-
low to set up different linear and nonlinear specifications, including the lagged VaR estimate
as a regressor, and they do not rely on distributional assumptions.
We find that although the CAViaR models obtain almost perfect in-sample fits in the
case of 1% VaR, the Double Kernel Local Linear (DKLL) estimator of Yu and Jones (1998)
often outperforms them in terms of out-of-sample backtesting results, especially when the
estimation period is short relative to the forecasting period. Results are promising for 0.1%
VaR as well. The superiority of the EVT-refined DKLL estimator over the plain DKLL
estimator is shown in a small simulation study. It turns out that, especially when the esti-
mation window is small relative to the forecasting period, the extreme value theory-refined
nonparametric model predicts extreme VaRs very accurately.
Section 1.2 of this chapter outlines the basic setup of conditional quantile models, be-
fore describing CAViaR models. The DKLL estimator used in the following is presented in
Section 1.3. Furthermore, the incorporation of extreme value theory into the model is ex-
plained. The investigated data sets and the backtesting method are summarized in Section
1.4. The empirical results on 1% and 0.1% VaR estimation are stated in Section 1.5. In
Section 1.6, the performance of the EVT-refined nonparametric model is further assessed
via a small simulation study. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Quantile regression approaches to VaR estima-
tion
1.2.1 Conditional quantiles
Let {Yt}nt=1 be a strictly stationary time series of portfolio returns and let Xt be a d-
dimensional vector of regressors. The pth conditional quantile of Yt, denoted by qp(x),
is defined as
qp(x) = inf {y ∈ R : F(y|x) ≥ p} ≡ F−1(p|x), (1.1)













where I(A) denotes the indicator function on some set A. Both formulations are widely
used in the literature. In the seminal paper by Koenker and Bassett (1978) a sample equiv-
alent of (1.2) where q(Xt) = X′tβ, also including the special case Xt = 1, is established.
β is a d-dimensional vector of unknown parameters. The linear quantile model is extended
to conditionally heteroskedastic processes in Koenker and Zhao (1996). In Engle and Man-
ganelli (2004) conditional autoregressive quantile functions are estimated using (1.2) with
q(Xt) possibly being nonlinear in parameters, see Section 1.2.2 for some examples. In a
number of papers, localized kernel versions of (1.2) are estimated, leading to a nonparamet-
ric fit: Yu and Jones (1997) compare the goodness of fit of local constant and local linear
models. Cai (2002), Yu and Jones (1998), Cai and Wang (2008) propose nonparametric
methods to estimate the distribution function in (1.1), which, in a second step, is inverted.
Section 1.3.1 contains more details on these approaches. Wu, Yu, and Mitra (2007) model
(1.1) without regressors, and Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001) operationalize a linear
version of (1.1).
Following the convention of expressing VaR as a positive number, it is defined as
VaRtp(·) = −qtp(·),
where qtp is the quantile of the return distribution corresponding to probability p, at time
t. VaRtp denotes a generic VaR measure which may depend on x and/or a vector of pa-
rameters β. To simplify notation, index t is suppressed in contexts where it does not cause
confusion.1
1.2.2 Conditional Autoregressive VaR (CAViaR) Models
The class of Conditional Autoregressive Value at Risk (CAViaR) models, first introduced
by Engle and Manganelli (2004), is used to benchmark the forecast performance of the
nonparametric VaR estimators considered in this chapter. Several comparison studies have
done so, for example Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) or Taylor (2008). CAViaR
models are dynamic VaR models describing the quantile of a random variable at time t,
e.g., the return on a financial portfolio, as possibly nonlinear function of its own lags and,
in addition, of a vector of observable variables, Xt,








β j f (Xt−j),
1Although the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision asks banks to report VaR for a 10-day
holding period, we focus on one-day-ahead forecasts, which is in line with the literature.
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(Yt + VaRtp(β)). (1.3)
A straightforward choice for Xt is lagged returns. Following the original article, the spec-
ifications used here include the first lagged value of VaRp(·) and the first lagged value of
Yt, therefore Xt = Yt−1.
Well-known stylized facts on asset returns are, firstly, that they exhibit volatility clus-
tering. It carries over to VaR: if high variation is observed in returns of the recent past, it
is likely to continue, and risk is therefore high as well. Secondly, quantiles (or volatility)
might react differently according to the sign of past returns. This possibility is captured by
the Asymmetric Slope specification
VaRtp(β) = β1 + β2VaR
t−1
p (β) + β3(Yt−1)
+ + β4(Yt−1)−, (1.4)




β1 + β2(VaRt−1p )2(β) + β3Y2t−1. (1.5)
The Asymmetric Slope CAViaR imposes a piecewise linear structure on VaR, although the
true functional form might be nonlinear. As pointed out in Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella
(2006), financial returns may also have an autoregressive (AR) mean, which is neglected
by the CAViaR specifications. For these reasons we combine the features of the above, by
allowing for nonlinearity and asymmetric effects of past returns, and additionally incorpo-
rate an AR mean, by introducing an alternative specification, called Indirect Autoregressive
Threshold GARCH (AR-TGARCH(1,1)) CAViaR:
VaRtp(β) = β1Yt−1 +
(
β2 + β3(VaRt−1p )
2(β) + β4Y2t−1 + β5(Yt−1)





Including the AR term introduces the possibility for a nonzero autoregressive mean, asym-
metry is present if β5 6= 0 and the square root allows for a nonlinear functional form.
For estimating the parameters of the CAViaR models, an algorithm similar to the one
proposed in the original paper by Engle and Manganelli (2004) is applied. A grid search is
conducted by generating a large number of random vectors, the dimension of which corre-
sponds to the number of model parameters. The five vectors which lead to the lowest values
of the objective function (1.3) are selected and fed into a simplex optimization algorithm.
The final parameter vector is chosen to be the one minimizing (1.3). Our new AR-TGARCH
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specification fits into this procedure.
1.3 Nonparametric quantile regression with refine-
ments from extreme value theory
1.3.1 Double Kernel Local Linear VaR regression
In general, estimating nonparametric models requires large amounts of data. Since VaR
corresponds to a quantile at the tail of the return distribution, suitable nonparametric quan-
tile estimators should be able to deal with areas where data are sparse. Therefore, from
the variety of nonparametric quantile estimators, the Double Kernel Local Linear (DKLL)
estimator of Yu and Jones (1998) is chosen for the VaR application, because it localizes the
data in both x- and y-direction, which leads to smoother estimates. For more details on
regularity assumptions and asymptotic properties, see the original article by Yu and Jones
(1998). The Weighted Double Kernel Local Linear estimator of Cai and Wang (2008), a
Nadaraya Watson type estimator, forms an alternative to the DKLL estimator. In a small
simulation study, which is not reported here, the DKLL estimator performed slightly better
at design points at the boundary of the support of the data. Therefore, we choase it for our
application.
For notational convenience, observations {(Xt, Yt)}nt=1 are assumed to be drawn from
an underlying bivariate distribution F(x, y) with density f (x, y). The extension to the mul-
tivariate case is straightforward, but requires more tedious notation. The estimator is defined
as inverse of a conditional distribution function as in (1.1). Throughout this section, quan-
tiles of return distributions are discussed, so that VaR corresponds to the negative quantile.





wt(x)I(Yt ≤ y), (1.7)
where I(·) is again an indicator function and the weights wt(x) are positive and sum up to
one. Choosing equal weights w = 1/n yields the empirical distribution function. Using
instead a kernel function with bandwidth parameter h, in the following sometimes abbre-
viated by Kh(·) = 1h K(·/h), which is often chosen to be a symmetric probability density
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∑nt=1 Kh(x− Xt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wt(x)
I(Yt ≤ y), (1.8)
see for example Li and Racine (2007). It attaches a smooth set of weights to the data, and is
known to be monotone increasing and bounded between zero and one. However, it suffers
from boundary distortion, as shown by Fan and Gijbels (1996). They advocate the use of
local polynomial estimators, the simplest of which is the local linear estimator.
One way to reduce distortions that arise due to a limited number of observations is to smooth
not only the observations of the regressor variable Xt, but also the observations of the de-
pendent variable Yt. This requires the introduction of a second symmetric kernel Wh2(·).
Its kernel distribution is defined by
∫ y
−∞






with h2 being the bandwidth parameter. It can be viewed as a smooth, differentiable version
of the indicator function.
As a next step, the conditional distribution value of y is approximated by a linear Taylor
expansion around x. The estimate F̂(y|x) = β̂0 is obtained from











− β0 − β1(Xt − x)
)2
Kh1 (x− Xt) , (1.10)






Kh1 (x− Xt) [S2 − (x− Xt)S1]


















(x− Xi)l , l = 1, 2.
(1.11) is a version of (1.7) where the kernel distribution function Ω(·) in (1.9) replaces the








with F̂ from (1.11). In finite samples, F̂(y|x) might not always be monotonically increasing.
In such cases, however, the inverse is not defined. Yu and Jones (1998) suggest the following
implementation scheme: For q̂1/2(x), any value satisfying (1.12) is chosen; for p > 1/2,
the largest, and for p < 1/2, the smallest solutions to (1.12) are taken as quantile estimates.
In this chapter, a stronger procedure is applied, avoiding to delete estimated values.
Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2009) show that any nonmonotone estimate
of a monotone function can be improved in terms of common metrics, such as the Lp-norm,
by simple rearranging. In an earlier work, Dette, Neumeyer, and Pilz (2006) propose a
similar method of smoothed rearrangements. For the case of a monotone increasing (de-
creasing) function, the point estimates are sorted in ascending (descending) order. Making
use of these theoretical results, nonmonotone distribution estimates are rearranged before
inverting. In the present context of monotonizing the estimated distribution function, a fur-
ther effect is that quantile crossing is circumvented. Estimated values greater than one are
discarded.
1.3.2 Refining nonparametric quantile regression with extreme
value theory
For extreme quantiles, usually very few data points are available, so that fully nonparametric
regression does not yield reliable estimates. Extreme value theory (EVT) is an alternative to
model extreme quantiles. In the following, a method of incorporating extreme value theory
into CAViaR models, which was introduced by Manganelli and Engle (2001), is adapted to
obtain 0.1% VaR estimates from a nonparametric model.










While p denotes here the (very low) probability of interest, p2 corresponds to a moderately
low probability for which the quantile can be estimated nonparametrically, for example
p2 = 0.01 or p2 = 0.05. McNeil and Frey (2000) employ a similar technique to esti-
mate 1% VaR from a GARCH residual series. An EVT-augmented nonparametric kernel
distribution estimator is also considered by MacDonald, Scarrott, Lee, Darlow, Reale, and
Russell (2011), who show consistency of their method via Bayesian inference.
Reformulating the definition of the pth quantile of portfolio returns in terms of the p2th
12
quantile yields
P[Yt < qtp] = P
[





















denote the (1− p)th quantile of the standardized residuals. It is estimated by the peaks
over threshold (POT) method. Alternatively, it could be estimated by other methods, such
as the Hill estimator, as well. A number of applications employ the POT method to forecast
extreme quantiles; for a selection of applications and an investigation of its finite sample
properties see El-Arouia and Diebolt (2002). An estimate for the pth return quantile can be
expressed by means of ẑp and q̂tp2 ,
q̂tp
q̂tp2
− 1 = ẑp ⇔ q̂tp = q̂tp2(ẑp + 1). (1.14)
Again, V̂aR
t
p = −q̂tp. In the remainder of this section, the underlying extreme value
arguments, which are used to obtain ẑp in (1.14), are discussed very briefly, following Em-
brechts, Klüppelberg, and Mikosch (1997).
Large observations which exceed a high threshold can be approximated reasonably well by
the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) with distribution function
Gξ,β(x) =
{
−(1 + ξx/β)1/ξ for ξ 6= 0
1− ex/β for ξ = 0,
(1.15)
with shape parameter ξ and scale parameter β > 0. The support is x ≥ 0 when ξ ≥ 0
and 0 ≤ x ≤ − βξ if ξ < 0. The parameters can be consistently estimated if the thresh-
old exceedances are independent, regardless of the true underlying distribution, see Smith
(1987). In general, given a high threshold u and a random variable Y, the probability of Y
exceeding u at most by x is given by
Fu(x) = P[Y− u ≤ x|Y > u] =
F(x + u)− F(u)
1− F(u) . (1.16)
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Balkema and de Haan (1974) and Pickands (1975) show that for a large class of distribution





∣∣∣Fu(x)− Gξ,β(u)(x)∣∣∣ = 0, (1.17)
with y0 corresponding to the right endpoint of F. Rearranging (1.16) and using Fu(·) ≈
Gξ,β(·), it holds that
1− F(u + x) ≈ [1− F(u)][1− Gξ,β(x)].
Then, 1− Gξ,β(x) can be obtained by estimating the GPD parameters by maximum like-
lihood. Let Nu denote the number of exceedances over threshold u. A common way of
estimating S(u) := 1− F(u) is to use the empirical distribution function Nun . Substituting
the estimates yields










The quantile can be estimated by inverting (1.18), employing a change of variables y =
u + x and fixing the distribution value at the probability of interest: F(y) = p. Therefore,
the quantile estimator q̂p is obtained from



















In general, extreme value methods require the underlying data to be i.i.d. Although
computing standardized residuals as in (1.13) should remove most of the dynamics, one
cannot eliminate the possiblitity of remaining autocorrelation. However, under some con-
ditions on the dependence structure (see e.g. Drees (2003) for details), the relationship
between the limiting distributions of the maxima of a dependent but strictly stationary se-
quence, (Yt)t∈N say, and a white noise sequence (Ỹt)t∈N with the same distribution func-
tion F may be described by the so-called extremal index θ ∈ (0, 1]. If the distribution of
normalized threshold exceedances in the sequence (Ỹt) converges to an extreme value dis-
tribution G(x), as in (1.17), then it can be shown that the equally normalized exceedances
of (Yt)t∈N converge to Gθ(x), see Embrechts, Klüppelberg, and Mikosch (1997). Thus,
the same limiting extreme value distribution may be used, while changing only the normal-
ization parameters.
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Intuitively, if our sequence of standardized residuals possesses an extremal index which
is < 1, then its extremal behavior is asymptotically the same as that of a shorter white noise
sequence with the same distribution. However, it might still be interesting to find out about
the extent of deviation from white noise for a given data set. The extremal index may be
estimated by the so-called Runs Method where θ is computed as the conditional probability
that a threshold exceedance is followed by a run of r non-exceedances. The idea is that
periods in between clusters of exceedances are longer than periods between independent
exceedances (for details see Embrechts, Klüppelberg, and Mikosch (1997), Chapter 8). The
higher the clustering tendency, the fewer runs will be present. The estimator is
θ̂ =
∑n−rt=1 I(At)
∑nt=1 I(Yt > u)
, (1.20)
where I(·) is again the indicator function and
At = {Yt > u, Yt+1 ≤ u, ..., Yt+r ≤ u} . (1.21)
Drees (2003) shows that a wide variety of financial time series, including ARMA and ARCH
processes, may be estimated by the POT maximum likelihood estimator which we use here.
He finds that the only difference to i.i.d. data is an increased variance of the quantile es-
timator, but this drawback does not affect our results, as our goal is forecasting accuracy,
which is checked via backtesting.
1.4 Data and backtesting method
We analyze four data sets of daily index returns, DAX, FTSE 100 (FTSE), EuroSTOXX 50
(EuroSTOXX) and S&P 500 (S&P). The longest available time series of each are used to
compute in-sample fits. The common end date of the in-sample period is 28/02/2003. We
predict VaR for the subsequent 1000 days, until the end of 2006 (29/12/2006). As a second
step, we take the same forecast period, but additionally include 300 days to check whether
model performances worsen when the data contains the beginning of the financial crisis.
The 1300-day forecast period ends on 22/02/2008. Table 1.1 summarizes some features of
the data.
The reason for using a rather long estimation period relative to the forecast horizon, is
that our aim is to assess and compare the quality of the nonparametric model in capturing
market risk, using as much information as possible. We are aware that in real life risk
management, available time series are typically much shorter. Therefore, in Section 1.5.2,
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we additionally estimate our models using only the last 1000 data points, from 30/04/1999
to 28/02/2003 and forecast 1% VaRs for the subsequent 200 and 1000 days. Realizations of
DAX FTSE EuroSTOXX S&P
start date 03/10/1966 03/01/1984 02/01/1987 31/07/1970
end in-sample period 28/02/2003 28/02/2003 28/02/2003 28/02/2003
no. of observations 9500 4998 4215 8500
mean 0.020 0.026 0.021 0.028
median 0.000 0.020 0.057 0.007
0.5% quantile -4.107 -3.470 -4.924 -3.009
99.5% quantile 3.686 3.258 4.157 3.239
skewness -0.422 -0.794 -0.326 -1.468
kurtosis 11.158 13.571 8.414 39.075
Table 1.1: Data summary for the four index time series used in the long estimation period.
quantiles cannot be observed. Therefore, backtesting of the models is carried out using the
dynamic quantile (DQ) out-of-sample test developed in Engle and Manganelli (2004) to test
and compare the performance of VaR models. From the variety of alternatives, we choose
this particular test, because it is the standard test to compare CAViaR and other models.
Define the binary variable
Hitt ≡ I(Yt < −VaRtp)− p.
If the chosen model is correct,
E[Hitt|Ωt] = 0, (1.22)
where Ωt is any information known up to time t. Thus, VaR is estimated correctly, if
independently for each day of the forecasting period, the probability of exceeding it equals
p. Note that this also implies that Hitt is uncorrelated with its own lagged values. Let Zt
denote a K-vector of variables potentially related to Hitt, and let Z denote the (N × K)-
matrix stacking the values of Zt, where N is the number of observations in the forecast
period. Then, the moment condition in (1.22) can be checked using the test statistic
DQ =
Hit′Z(Z′Z)−1Z′Hit
p(1− p) , (1.23)
where Hit is a vector containing all values of Hitt. Under the null hypothesis that (1.22)
holds, DQ is asymptotically χ2-distributed with K degrees of freedom. In analogy to Engle
and Manganelli (2004), Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) and Taylor (2008), we include
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a constant, four lagged values of Hitt and the current VaR estimate in the information set.
It can be seen immediately that for our information set, the DQ test statistic requires at
least one out-of-sample VaR exceedance in order to be defined. Otherwise, the lagged values
of Hitt would cause multicollinearity in the matrix Z. However, when considering extreme
VaR, as we do in Section 1.5.3, it might well be that there are no exceedances within the
forecasting period (note that the correct number of exceedances for 1000 forecasts of 0.1%
VaR is 1). Therefore, in order to be able to compare the different models while taking the
possibility of no exceedances into account, we employ the test proposed by Kupiec (1995)
which is an unconditional test of the correctness of the achieved share of VaR exceedances.
Define the indicator variable
It ≡ I(Yt < −VaRtp).







has a binomial distribution with parameters N and p. Under the null hypothesis of correct
coverage, the corresponding likelihood ratio statistic












is asymptotically χ2-distributed with one degree of freedom.
1.5 Application to stock index returns
1.5.1 Monotonicity of quantile curves
When forecasting from a nonparametric model, one has to balance two effects occurring at
the boundary areas: The support from which predictions of the dependent variable can be
computed is limited to the range in which the estimated function is located. This means that
for outlying lagged returns, which are not in the support of the estimated curve, no forecasts
for VaR exist. On the other hand, often only few data points are available at boundary
areas, so that outliers have more influence and the resulting curve may show distortions.
Therefore, one has to decide carefully about the range of the grid at which the function
is evaluated, balancing possible distortions against a limited range of regressor values to
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compute forecasts from.
We estimate the time-varying conditional 1% VaRs of DAX, EuroSTOXX, S&P and
FTSE using the DKLL estimator. Due to its double smoothing property, distortions are
eased and quantile curves are smoother. Additionally, we make use of the monotonization
method proposed by Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2009). Whenever curves
are not monotonically decreasing on the left of the minimum and monotonically increasing
on the right, estimated values are rearranged in descending and ascending order, respec-
tively. To illustrate possible changes in the in-sample fit, Figure 1.1 shows the original as
well as the rearranged 1% VaR curves of DAX and EuroSTOXX. Both curves cover 99%
of the data.




























































Figure 1.1: Original and rearranged DKLL estimates of 1% conditional DAX VaR curve
(upper panel) EuroSTOXX VaR curve (lower panel).
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Table 1.2 compares backtesting results on original and rearranged DKLL fits, on a fore-
cast horizon of 1000 days. In-sample and out-of-sample coverages are aimed to be as close
as possible to the underlying probability, in this case 1%. The p-value of the DQ test de-
scribed in Section 1.4 expresses the highest significance level at which the variables in the
information set are jointly significant. Therefore, a larger p-value indicates that the null
hypothesis of independent VaR exceedances is more likely not to be rejected, suggesting
that a model is more adequate. The theoretical results from Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val,
DAX FTSE
DKLL orig. DKLL rearr. DKLL orig. DKLL rearr.
in-sample (%) 0.78 0.78 0.94 0.95
out-of-sample (%) 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.50
DQ p-value 0.182 0.182 0.614 0.830
EuroSTOXX S&P500
DKLL orig. DKLL rearr. DKLL orig. DKLL rearr.
in-sample (%) 0.81 0.81 0.97 0.97
out-of-sample (%) 0.50 0.50 0.30 0.30
DQ p-value 0.859 0.859 0.544 0.544
Table 1.2: Backtest result comparison for original and rearranged DKLL models: DQ test
results for original and rearranged DKLL models as well as in-sample and out-of sample
share of VaR exceedances (in percent). The forecast period is 1000 observations.
and Galichon (2009), that rearranging weakly improves estimation, are confirmed by our
empirical results: Whenever values in the columns are different, they are superior for the
rearranged estimates. In-sample and out-of-sample coverages are closer to 1% in case of
the FTSE return series. Furthermore, the DQ test p-value substantially increases, indicating
that the null hypothesis of the DQ test is “further away” from rejection than in the case of
the original DKLL model. Whenever we mention results for the DKLL estimator in the
following, it refers to the rearranged version.
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1.5.2 Comparing 1% VaR predictions
Long estimation period
Table 1.3 lists backtest results of the CAViaR and the rearranged DKLL estimates which
are obtained from the data set data set described in Table 1.1. Generally, the in-sample
exceedance shares achieved by all three CAViaR specifications are very close to the under-
lying probability 1%. In contrast, the DKLL estimator has a slight tendency to overestimate
VaR, leading to in-sample coverages below 1%.
In terms of out-of-sample forecasting, results differ among the four indices. In pre-
dicting DAX VaR, the CAViaR models perform quiete poorly on both forecast horizons.
Out-of-sample coverages are too high, and the DQ test p-values raise doubt that the mod-
els are able to generate conditionally independent VaR exceedances and correct coverage.
In contrast, the DKLL estimate achieves more accurate out-of-sample exceedance rates in
predicting VaR over both 1000 and 1300 days, and the test results suggest that the model is
appropriate at least for the shorter forecast horizon.
In the case of FTSE VaR, results are mixed: The DKLL estimator overestimates VaR in
the short prediction period (coverage is 0.5%), where, however, it yields a good fit according
to the backtest. For 1300 forecasts, it achieves the correct coverage, but the DQ p-value
drops sharply. The CAViaR models, are strongly rejected in the short horizon, but show a
better performance in the longer one.
The picture for EuroSTOXX is somewhat similar to that of FTSE, except that the results
from the CAViaR models now differ more strongly among each other, and the Asymmetric
Slope CAViaR beats all the other models considered. The p-value obtained by the DKLL
estimator again drops when moving from the short to the longer forecast horizon, but it is
still above the p-values of GARCH and AR-TGARCH CAViaR, which perform better in
terms of out-of-sample coverages.
The results for S&P VaR show a different structure. Although all coverages within the
short prediction period are low, the DQ test indicates adequate out-of-sample fits. For the
extended horizon, all p-values drop, such that the GARCH CAViaR and the DKLL models
are even rejected at a 1% significance level. One possible reason is that the additionally
included observations exhibit some dynamics which are not well captured by these models,
leading to a clustering of VaR exceedances. Interestingly, the AR-TGARCH is least affected
by this effect.
The AR-TGARCH CAViaR model does not outperform the other two CAViaR models
and the DKLL model systematically, but its results are less varying: For both in-sample
and out-of-sample forecast horizons, its coverage and backtest results are often better than
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Asymm. Slope GARCH AR-TGARCH DKLL
DAX
in-sample 1.01 1.01 1.04 0.78
out-of-sample (1000) 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.00
out-of-sample (1300) 1.54 1.54 1.61 1.07
DQ p-value (1000) 0.054∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.182
DQ p-value (1300) 0.043∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.040∗∗
FTSE
in-sample 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.94
out-of-sample (1000) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.50
out-of-sample (1300) 1.08 1.16 1.08 1.00
DQ p-value (1000) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.830
DQ p-value (1300) 0.040∗∗ 0.104 0.059∗ 0.011∗∗
EuroSTOXX
in-sample 1.04 0.99 0.99 0.81
out-of-sample (1000) 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.50
out-of-sample (1300) 0.76 0.92 0.92 0.62
DQ p-value (1000) 0.970 0.058∗ 0.057∗ 0.859
DQ p-value (1300) 0.980 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.031∗∗
S&P
in-sample 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.97
out-of-sample (1000) 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
out-of-sample (1300) 0.92 1.00 0.69 1.15
DQ p-value (1000) 0.547 0.285 0.547 0.544
DQ p-value (1300) 0.042∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.008∗∗∗
Table 1.3: Backtesting results for 1% VaR models: Long estimation period: In-sample
and out-of-sample exceedance probabilities in %. Considered forecast horizons are 1000
and 1300 observations. Models which are rejected by the DQ test are marked with ∗ for
rejection on 10%, ∗∗ on 5% and ∗∗∗ on 1% significance level.
the results of one of the two others. We attribute this finding to the fact that the model
combines the features of Asymmetric Slope and Indirect GARCH specification, and it is
therefore more universally applicable.
Summing up, the out-of-sample VaR prediction results produced by the fully nonpara-
metric DKLL estimator are satisfactory except for the extended forecast horizon in the case
of the S&P. The CAViaR models are strong competitors, however, they have the drawback
that it is not possible to detect one parameterization that systematically dominates others.
As it is often the case with parametric models, the question remains which one to choose in
practical applications. The DKLL model, on the other hand, outperforms at least one of the
CAViaR models in most cases, and is therefore the most robust alternative.
21
Short estimation period
In real life risk management, time series available for the estimation of VaR models are
rarely as long as the ones we investigate in the previous section. For this reason, we re-
peat the estimation using only 1000 observations, i.e. roughly the last four years up to
28/02/2003, and forecast VaRs for both the subsequent 200 and 1000 days. Table 1.4 lists
the backtesting results. The good performance of the DKLL estimator carries over to the
Asymm. Slope GARCH AR-TGARCH DKLL
DAX
in-sample 1.10 1.10 0.90 0.80
out-of-sample (200) 2.50 1.50 2.50 0.50
out-of-sample (1000) 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.10
DQ p-value (200) 0.409 0.839 0.410 0.967
DQ p-value (1000) 0.603 0.061∗ 0.671 0.195
FTSE
in-sample 1.00 1.00 1.10 0.70
out-of-sample (200) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50
out-of-sample (1000) 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.10
DQ p-value (200) 0.810 1.000 0.975 0.997
DQ p-value (1000) 0.020∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.225
EuroSTOXX
in-sample 1.10 1.00 1.10 1.10
out-of-sample (200) 1.50 1.00 1.50 1.00
out-of-sample (1000) 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.20
DQ p-value (200) 0.985 1.000 0.992 1.000
DQ p-value (1000) 0.674 0.652 0.713 0.356
S&P
in-sample 1.00 1.00 1.10 0.90
out-of-sample (200) 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50
out-of-sample (1000) 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10
DQ p-value (200) 0.536 0.742 0.390 0.975
DQ p-value (1000) 0.206 0.110 0.210 0.212
Table 1.4: Backtesting results for 1% VaR models: Short estimation period, using only
1000 observations. In-sample and out-of-sample exceedance probabilities in %. Considered
forecast horizons are 200 and 1000 observations. Models which are rejected by the DQ test
are marked with ∗ for rejection on 10%, ∗∗ on 5% and ∗∗∗ on 1% significance level.
short estimation period. Although VaR estimates are again too conservative in particular
for the longer forecasting period, the null hypothesis of valid moment conditions tested by
the DQ test is never rejected even on a 10% significance level. The CAViaR models also
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overestimate VaR for the subsequent 1000 observations, and additionally, they are rejected
by the DQ test in the case of FTSE. Based on these results, it can be said that the DKLL
estimator is also applicable when the estimation period is rather short, and keeps yielding
reliable VaR forecasts even for the distant future.
1.5.3 Comparing extreme VaR predictions
Following the procedure described in Section 1.3.2, standardized residuals are computed
from the rearranged DKLL estimate and the time-varying 0.1% quantile of time series Yt
is calculated according to (1.14). The underlying ’moderate’ probability is chosen to be
1%. Similarly, VaR estimates obtained from the EVT-augmented CAViaR models are com-
puted, following Manganelli and Engle (2001). As mentioned at the end of Section 1.3.2,
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Figure 1.2: Autocorrelation functions of the standardized nonparametric residuals for the
four indices. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.
the data should be checked for dependence before applying extreme value methods. Figure
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1.2 shows autocorrelation functions (ACFs) for the standardized residuals from the non-
parametric model, together with 95% confidence intervals. Although the magnitude of the
autocorrelation is not very high, for some lags, the confidence intervals are exceeded. There-
fore, we carry out Ljung-Box tests on independence based on 20 lags, the results of which
imply significant autocorrelation on a 1% confidence level for all four considered models
and all model specifications. Fitting simple AR models to the standardized residuals, how-
ever, removes the autocorrelation entirely, see Table 1.5. The corresponding results for the
three CAViaR specifications are very similar, and thus, not shown here. They are available
upon request. Since McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts (2005) state that ARMA processes with
innovations drawn from fat-tailed distributions exhibit values of the extremal index θ < 1,
we also estimate the extremal indices using the Runs Method (1.20) described in Section
1.3.2 and report them in the last column of Table 1.5. The parameter r, corresponding to
the length of runs, was set to 30 for all three indices, after finding that the estimated θ̂ was
very robust with respect to plausible choices of r. As McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts (2005)
point out, the distribution of the maximum of n dependent data points with extremal in-
dex θ can be approximated by the associated i.i.d. series with nθ observations. Given the
large number of data points in all our samples, we conclude that the loss in accuracy due
to dependence in the standardized residuals is not too severe. Therefore, we can apply the
proposed method to estimate the 0.1%-VaRs.
LB p-value LB p-value for AR residuals AR lag order θ̂
DAX 0.000 0.529 7 0.80
FTSE 0.000 0.203 9 0.91
EuroSTOXX 0.001 0.357 9 0.85
S&P 0.000 0.224 4 0.88
Table 1.5: Remaining autocorrelation and extremal index estimates: The first column re-
ports the outcomes (p-values) of the Ljung-Box (LB) test on independence of the stan-
dardized residuals from the DKLL model. The null hypothesis of independence is always
rejected on a 1% confidence level. The second column contains the LB test results after
fitting an autoregressive (AR) model to the standardized residuals. In all cases, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. The selected lag order is reported in the third column. The
forth column contains estimates of the extremal index θ.
Table 1.6 contains both in-sample and out-of-sample shares of 0.1% VaR exceedances
for the four models. Only the long estimation period is considered. However, the simulation
study in Section 1.6 contains a discussion of results from the nonparametric model for
extreme quantiles, based on a shorter space of time. Due to the occurrence of no VaR
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exceedances within the prediction period, we use the Kupiec test instead of the DQ test
for backtesting. It checks the correctness of the achieved unconditional coverage via a
likelihood ratio approach, which is based on the Bernoulli likelihood, see Section 1.4.
Asymm. Slope GARCH AR-TGARCH DKLL
DAX
in-sample 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.13
out-of-sample(1000) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
out-of-sample(1300) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.23
Kupiec p-value (1000) 0.157 0.157 0.157 1.000
Kupiec p-value (1300) 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.203
FTSE
in-sample 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16
out-of-sample(1000) 0.10 0.20 0.10 0.10
out-of-sample(1300) 0.15 0.38 0.15 0.15
Kupiec p-value (1000) 1.000 0.379 1.000 1.000
Kupiec p-value (1300) 0.570 0.014∗∗ 0.570 0.570
EuroSTOXX
in-sample 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.24
out-of-sample(1000) 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.00
out-of-sample(1300) 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.15
Kupiec p-value (1000) 1.000 0.379 0.379 0.157
Kupiec p-value (1300) 0.203 0.058∗ 0.058∗ 0.570
S&P
in-sample 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.12
out-of-sample(1000) 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
out-of-sample(1300) 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.00
Kupiec p-value (1000) 1.000 0.157 0.157 0.157
Kupiec p-value (1300) 0.570 0.784 0.784 0.107
Table 1.6: Backtesting results for 0.1% VaR models: In-sample and out-of-sample ex-
ceedance probabilities in %. Considered forecast horizons are 1000 and 1300 observations.
Models which are rejected by the DQ test are marked with ∗ for rejection on 10%, ∗∗ on 5%
and ∗∗∗ on 1% significance level.
In contrast to the outcomes of the 1% VaR analysis, in-sample VaR exceedance shares
achieved by the DKLL estimator are now less conservative, but instead always slightly
higher than the target probability 0.1%. On the other hand, out-of sample coverage and
backtest results are remarkably good especially for FTSE and EuroSTOXX, where the
DKLL estimator shows best results on one of the two considered forecast horizon, but also
for DAX, where its coverages are very close to 0.1%. Concerning S&P, the Asymmetric
Slope CAViaR model yields the most accurate fit, except for the in-sample exceedance rate,
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which is closer to 0.1% in the case of the DKLL model. According to the Kupiec test,
the differences to the nominal coverage are rarely significant, the only exception being the
GARCH and AR-TGARCH CAViaRs when predicting 1300 days of EuroSTOXX VaR, and
GARCH CAViaR for the extended forecast period of FTSE VaR.
It was pointed out in Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006), that for comparison of VaR
prediction strategies, the focus should not be limited to one or two probability levels, but
one should take a range of quantiles into account when deciding which model is the best.
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Figure 1.3: Graphical comparison of coverage results
Coverage results in % for 0.1%-1% ranges of estimated EVT-augmented index VaRs. The
evaluated forecast horizon is 1300 days. Nominal coverages are on the horizontal axis, and
the lines correspond to the differences of nominal and estimated VaR exceedance shares (in
%). The closer they are to zero, the better the (unconditional) model fit.
We adapt their graphical representation of coverage accuracy in Figure 1.3 for VaR lev-
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els between 0.1% and 1%. For the sake of clarity, the AR-TGARCH CAViaR, which usually
showed results that were similar to one of the other two CAViaR models, is not included
in the graph. It turns out that the Asymmetric Slope CAViaR is the stronger competitor for
the DKLL model, as in three out of four cases, the lines corresponding to its differences to
the nominal coverages are closer to zero than those corresponding to the GARCH CAViaR.
In some ranges, e.g. 0.1%-0.5% FTSE VaR, the DKLL model clearly yields a very good
fit. In other cases, such as DAX, all three models do not hit the correct coverages. The
DKLL estimator, however, goes head to head with the CAViaR models, while sometimes
even beating them.
1.6 Simulation: Comparing DKLL and EVT-refined
VaR estimation
This section is devoted to the question of whether it is sensible to refine the nonparamet-
ric VaR estimator with extreme value methods, instead of using the plain version even for
extreme VaR estimation. One would expect that especially for small data sets, the EVT ex-
trapolation into the far tails of return distributions yields more stable results than estimating
the tail quantiles directly. In order to check this, we carry out a small simulation study to
complement the previous empirical results. As the goal is to assess the relative accuracies
of DKLL and EVT-refined DKLL estimators, we do not additionally include the CAViaR
models.
To the FTSE time series, we fit a GARCH(1,1) model with t-distributed error terms, i.e. we
estimate the unknown parameters µ, ω, α, β, and ν in




t−1, εt ∼ tν. (1.24)
The estimates are listed in Table 1.7.
µ̂ ω̂ α̂ β̂ ν̂
0.054 0.015 0.083 0.904 10
Table 1.7: Estimated GARCH parameters from the FTSE return series with 4998 observa-
tions. This estimated model is used in the simulation.
From the estimated model, a time series of 13000 observations is simulated. To obtain
a setup which is realistic with respect to usual data availability, only 2000 observations are
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used to estimate the models, and 0.1% VaR predictions are computed over two forecast
horizons, N=5000 and N=10000. The advantages of simulated data are that they allow for




where F−1p (εt) denotes the p-quantile of the error term distribution, can be computed be-
cause the input parameters are known. This allows us to compare the estimated VaRs to
their true counterparts. Table 1.8 shows coverages, mean squared errors, mean absolute
errors and median absolute errors in-sample and out-of-sample for both models.
in-sample: n=2000
cov. M̂SE M̂AE M̂ed.AE
DKLL 0.001 1.049 0.753 0.52
EVT-DKLL 0.001 0.605 0.579 0.429
out-of-sample: N=5000 out-of-sample: N=10000
cov. M̂SE M̂AE M̂ed.AE cov. M̂SE M̂AE M̂ed.AE
DKLL 0.009 3.673 1.359 0.9 0.008 3.379 1.253 0.787
EVT-DKLL 0.003 2.455 1.067 0.649 0.004 2.281 0.981 0.578
Table 1.8: Coverages and different loss functions from comparing the estimated 0.1% VaRs
with the true quantile function. Cov. stands for coverage, MSE for mean squared error,
MAE for mean absolute error and Med. AE for median absolute error.
Throughout, the EVT-augmented DKLL model yields lower losses and better coverages
than the plain DKLL model. In order to robustify this result, we repeated the simulation for
GARCH parameters estimated from EuroSTOXX data, and using different numbers of in-
sample observations. All these results, which are available on request, lead to the conclusion
that that the combination of standardized nonparametric residuals and extreme value theory
is a valuable complement to the rearranged DKLL estimator, which we suggest to use for
estimating moderately low quantiles.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a way to estimate and predict conditional Value at Risk using a
nonparametric model. We consider probabilities that are of practical interest for financial
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institutions. For external market risk reporting, 1% portfolio VaRs have to be estimated on a
daily basis. Internal risk management sometimes requires to take even more extreme proba-
bilities, such as 0.1%, into account. Although typically very few observations are available
in the extreme tails, models to be used should be flexible and rest upon as few structural
assumptions as possible. We suggest to use nonparametric quantile regression, more specif-
ically, a rearranged Double Kernel Local Linear VaR estimator as well as a version of the
latter augmented by extreme value theory. Both are applied to different index return time
series. Forecast performances are benchmarked against the widely used CAViaR models.
Although these also perform well in many occasions, none of the considered specifications
systematically dominates the others. In constrast to them, nonparametric regression circum-
vents the issue of choosing the appropriate parametrization.
Backtesting results from the evaluation of real as well as simulated data examples lead
to the conclusion that the fully nonparametric and the EVT-refined nonparametric models do
not only outperform the parametric alternatives in a considerable number of situations, but
that they can be used to predict VaR of any probability level of interest, even when the esti-
mation period is of moderate size. In recent years, computing power has increased to such
an extent that fully nonparametric models come at little more computation cost than other
models that rely on more restrictive assumptions. From the results in this paper, however,
we conclude that the gains on the additional flexibility are substantial and nonparametric
quantile regression with EVT refinements should be considered as a practical alternative for




Financial Network Systemic Risk
Contributions
This chapter is based on Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012a).
2.1 Introduction
The financial crisis 2007–2009 has shown that cross-sectional dependencies between assets
and credit exposures can cause even small risks of individual banks to cascade and build
up to a substantial threat for the stability of an entire financial system.1 Under certain
economic conditions, company-specific risk cannot be appropriately assessed in isolation
without accounting for potential risk spillover effects from other firms. In fact, it is not
just its size and idiosyncratic risk but also its interconnectedness with other firms which
determines a company’s systemic relevance i.e., its potential to significantly increase the
risk of failure of the entire system – which we denote as systemic risk.2 While there is a
broad consensus that any prudential regulatory policy should account for the consequences
of network interdependencies in the financial system, in practice, however, any attempt of
a transparent implementation must fail, as long as suitable empirical measures for firms’
individual risk, risk spillovers and systemic relevance are not available. In particular, it
is unclear how to quantify individual risk exposures and systemic risk contributions in an
appropriate but still parsimonious and empirically tractable way for a prevailing underlying
1For a thorough description of the financial crisis, see, e.g., Brunnermeier (2009).
2Bernanke (2009) and Rajan (2009) stress the danger induced by institutions which are “too
interconnected to fail” or “too systemic to fail” in contrast to the insufficient focus on firms which
are simply “too big too fail”.
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network structure. And there is an apparent need for empirically feasible and forward-
looking measures which only rely on available data of publicly disclosed balance sheet and
market information but still account for the complexity of the financial system.
A general empirical assessment of systemic relevance cannot build on the vast theo-
retical literature of financial network models and financial contagion, since these results
typically require detailed information on intra-bank asset and liability exposures (see, e.g.,
Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000), and Leitner (2005)). Such data
is generally not publicly disclosed and even regulators can only collect partial information
on some sources of inter-bank linkages. Available empirical studies linked to this literature
can therefore only partially contribute to a full picture of companies’ systemic relevance
as they focus on particular parts of specific markets at a particular time under particular
financial conditions (see, e.g., Upper and Worms (2004), and Furfine (2003), for Germany
and the U.S., respectively).3 Furthermore, assessing risk interconnections on the basis of
multivariate failure probability distributions has proven to be statistically complicated with-
out using restrictive assumptions driving the results (see, e.g., Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and
Thurner (2004), or Zhou (2010), and references therein). Finally, for regulators it is often
unclear, how complex structures ultimately translate into dynamic and predictable measures
of systemic relevance.
The objective of this chapter is to develop an easily and widely applicable measure
of a firm’s systemic relevance, explicitly accounting for the company’s interconnectedness
within the financial sector. We assess companies’ risk of financial distress on the basis of
share price information which directly incorporates market perceptions of a firm’s prospects,
publicly accessible market data as well as balance sheet data. As for risk interconnectedness
only dependencies in extreme tails of asset return distributions matter, we base our measure
on extreme conditional quantiles of corresponding return distributions quantifying the risk
of distress of individual companies and the entire system respectively. In this sense, our
setting builds on the concept of conditional Value-at-Risk (VaR), which is a popular and
widely accepted measure for tail risk.4 For each firm, we identify its so-called relevant
3See also Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2009) for parts of the financial sector in Portugal, Elsinger,
Lehar, and Summer (2006) for Austria, and Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium. A rare excep-
tion is the unique data set for India with full information on the intra-banking market studied in Iyer
and Peydrió (2011).
4Note that the VaR is a coherent risk measure in realistic market settings, i.e., in cases of return
distributions with tails decaying faster than those of the Cauchy distribution, see Garcia, Renault,
and Tsafack (2007). In principle, our methodology could also be adapted to other tail risk measures
such as, e.g., expected shortfall. Such a setting, however, would involve additional estimation steps
and complications, probably inducing an overall loss of accuracy in results given the limited amount
of available data.
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(tail) risk drivers as the minimal set of macroeconomic fundamentals, firm-specific char-
acteristics and risk spillovers from competitors and other companies driving the company’s
VaR. Detecting with whom and how strongly any institution is connected allows us to con-
struct a tail risk network of the financial system. A company’s contribution to systemic risk
is then defined as the induced total effect of an increase in its individual tail risk on the
VaR of the entire system, conditional on the firm’s position within the financial network as
well as overall market conditions. Furthermore, by assessing a company’s conditional VaR
in dependence of respective tail risk drivers, we obtain a reliable measure of a company’s
idiosyncratic risk in the presence of network spillovers.
The underlying statistical setting is a two-stage quantile regression approach: In the first
step, firm-specific VaRs are estimated as functions of firm characteristics, macroeconomic
state variables as well as tail risk spillovers of other banks which are captured by loss ex-
ceedances. Hereby, the major challenge is to shrink the high-dimensional set of possible
cross-linkages between all financial firms to a feasible number of relevant risk connections.
We address this issue statistically as a model selection problem in individual institution’s
VaR specifications which we solve in a pre-step. In particular, we make use of novel Least
Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) techniques (see Belloni and Cher-
nozhukov (2011)) which allows us to identify the relevant tail risk drivers for each company
in a fully automatic way. The resulting identified risk interconnections are best represented
in terms of a network graph as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (and discussed in more detail in the
remainder of the chapter) for the system of 57 of the largest U.S. financial companies. In
the second step, for measuring a firm’s systemic impact, we individually regress the VaR
of a value-weighted index of the financial sector on the firm’s estimated VaR while con-
trolling for the pre-identified company-specific risk drivers as well as macroeconomic state
variables. We derive standard errors which explicitly account for estimation errors resulting
from the pre-estimation of regressors in quantile relations. As the generally available sam-
ple sizes of balance sheet and macroeconomic information make the use of large-sample
inference questionable, we provide (non-standard) bootstrap methods to construct finite-
sample-based parameter tests.
We determine a company’s systemic risk contribution as the marginal effect of its indi-
vidual VaR on the VaR of the system. In analogy to an (inverted) asset pricing relationship
in quantiles we call the measure systemic risk beta. It corresponds to the system’s marginal
risk exposure due to changes in the tail of a firm’s loss distribution. For comparing the
systemic relevance of companies across the system, however, it is necessary to compute the
induced total increase in systemic risk. We therefore rank companies according to their “re-
alized” systemic risk beta corresponding to the product of a company’s systemic risk beta
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Figure 2.1: Risk network of the U.S. financial system schematically highlighting key com-
panies in the system in 2000–2008. Details on all other firms in the system only appearing
as unlabeled shaded nodes will be provided later in the chapter. Depositories are marked in
red, broker dealers in green, insurance companies in black, others in blue. An arrow point-
ing from firm j to firm i reflects an impact of extreme returns of j on the VaR of i (VaRi)
which is identified as being relevant employing statistical selection techniques presented in
the remainder of the chapter. VaRs are measured in terms of 5%-quantiles of the return
distribution. The effect of j on i is measured in terms of the impact of an increase of the
return Xj on VaRi given Xj is below its 10% quantile. The size of the respective increase in
VaRi given a 1% increase of this “loss exceedance” of j is reflected by the thickness of the
respective arrowhead. We distinguish between three categories: thin arrowheads display an
increase up to 0.4, medium size of 0.4-0.8, and thick arrowheads of greater than 0.8. The
thickness of the line of the arrow is chosen along the same categories. If arrows point in
both directions, the thickness of the line corresponds to the bigger one of the two effects.
The graph is constructed such that the total length of all arrows in the system is minimized.
Accordingly, more interconnected firms are located in the center.
and its VaR. The systemic risk beta - and therefore also its realized version - is modeled
as a function of firm-specific characteristics, such as leverage, maturity mismatch and size.
Accordingly, a firm’s tail risk effect on the system can vary with its economic conditions
and/or its balance sheet structure changing its marginal systemic importance even though
its individual risk level might be identical at different time points.
Our empirical results reveal a high degree of tail risk interconnectedness among U.S. fi-
nancial institutions. In particular, we find that these network risk interconnection effects
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are the dominant risk drivers in individual risk. The detected channels of potential risk
spillovers contain fundamental information for supervision authorities but also for com-
pany risk managers. Based on the topology of the systemic risk network, we can categorize
firms into three broad groups according to their type and extent of connectedness with other
companies: main risk transmitters, risk recipients and companies which both receive and
transmit tail risk. From a regulatory point of view, the second group of pure risk recipients
has the least systemic impact. Monitoring their condition, however, might still convey im-
portant accumulated information on potentially hidden problems in those companies which
act as their risk drivers. In any case, the internal risk management of these companies should
account for the possible threat induced by the large degree of dependence on others. In par-
ticular, assessing their full risk exposures requires network augmented risk measures such
as, e.g., our proposed VaR specifications depending on (pre-selected) network risk drivers.
The highest attention of supervision authorities should be attracted by firms which mainly
act as risk drivers or are highly interconnected risk transmitters in the system. These are
particularly firms in the center of the network which appear as “too interconnected to fail”,
but also large risk producers at the boundary which are linked to only a few but heavily con-
nected risk transmitters. While the systemic risk network yields qualitative information on
risk channels and roles of companies within the financial system, estimates of systemic risk
betas allow to quantify the resulting individual systemic relevance and thus complement the
full picture. Ranking companies based on (realized) systemic risk betas shows that large de-
positories are particularly risky. After controlling for all relevant network effects, they have
the overall strongest impact on systemic risk and should be regulated accordingly. Confirm-
ing general intuition, time evolutions of (realized) systemic risk betas indicate that most
companies’ systemic risk contribution sharply increases during the 2007–2009 financial
crisis. These effects are particularly pronounced for firms, which indeed got into financial
distress during the crisis and are (ex post) identified as being clearly systemically risky by
our approach. Figure 2.2 exemplarily illustrates the evolutions of their marginal systemic
contributions – as reflected by systemic risk betas – as well as their exposure to idiosyncratic
tail risk – as quantified by their VaR. A detailed pre-crisis case study confirms the validity of
our methodology since firms such as, e.g., Lehman Brothers are ex-ante identified as being
highly systemically relevant. It is well-known that their subsequent failure has indeed had a
huge impact on the stability of the entire financial system. Likewise, the extensive bail-outs
of American International Group (AIG), Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae can be justified given
their high systemic risk betas and high interconnectedness by the end of 2007.
This chapter relates to several strands of recent empirical literature on systemic risk

















































Figure 2.2: Systemic relevance of five exemplary firms in the U.S. financial system at two
time points before and at the height of the financial crisis, 2008. Systemic relevance is
measured in “systemic risk betas” quantifying the marginal increase of the VaR of the sys-
tem given an increase in a bank’s VaR while controlling for the bank’s (pre-identified) risk
drivers. All VaRs are computed at the 5% level and are by definition positive. We de-
pict respective “realized” versions of the systemic risk beta corresponding to the product
of a risk beta and the corresponding VaR representing a company’s total effect on systemic
risk. Connecting lines are just added to graphically highlight changes between the two time
points but do not mark real evolutions. The size of the elements in the graph reflects the
size of the VaR of the respective company at each of the two time points. We use the fol-
lowing scale: the element is k·standard size with k = 1 for VaR ≤ 0.05, k = 1.5 for
VaR ∈ (0.05, 0.1], k = 2 for VaR ∈ (0.1, 0.15], k = 3 for VaR ∈ (0.2, 0.25] and k = 5.5
for VaR ∈ (0.65, 0.7]. Attached numbers inside the figure mark the position of the respec-
tive company in an overall ranking of the 57 largest U.S. financial companies for each of
the two time points.
bivariate vector-autoregressive system of each company’s VaR and the system VaR. They
capture time variations in tail risk in a pure time series setting which however does not
account for mutual dependencies and network effects. In contrast, our set-up models tail
risk in dependence of economic state variables and network spillovers which automatically
account for periods of turbulence when monitoring systemic relevance. Building on VaR,
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) were the first to construct a systemic risk measure, called
CoVaR, with balance sheet characteristics driving individual risk exposures. Note that Co-
VaR is conceptionally different two our two-step quantile approach and can by definition
only vary through the channel of individual risk of the considered company. Moreover, net-
36
work interconnections are not addressed which we identify as crucial for the performance
of the model. Our work also complements papers which measure a company’s systemic
relevance by focusing on the size of potential bail-out costs, such as Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon, and Richardson (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). Such approaches can-
not detect spillover effects driven by the topology of the risk network and might under-
estimate the systemic importance of small but very interconnected companies. Moreover,
while Brownlees and Engle (2012) study the situation of an individual firm given that the
system is under distress, we investigate the reverse relation and measure the effect on the
system given an individual firm is in financial trouble. Both approaches are justified as they
take complementary perspectives and measure different dimensions of systemic risk. In the
same way, we also complement macroeconomic approaches taking a more aggregated view
as, e.g., the literature on systemic risk indicators (e.g., Segoviano and Goodhart (2009),
2009, Giesecke and Kim (2011), 2011) or papers on early warning signals (e.g., Schwaab,
Koopman, and Lucas (2001), 2011, and Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2011), 2011).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we briefly explain
the modeling idea and describe the underlying data. Section 2.3 presents the model and esti-
mation procedure for individual companies’ VaRs, before discussing results on the financial
network structure. Section 2.4 gives the second stage, the system VaR model, including
estimation procedure, inference method and empirical results. In Section 2.5, we robustify
and validate our results by presenting a case study of five large financial institutions that
were affected by the financial crisis, and try to predict their distress and systemic relevance
using only pre-crisis data. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Measuring systemic relevance in a network
2.2.1 Framework
Assessing the dependence between systemic risk and firm-specific risk requires modeling
regression relations in the (left) tails of respective asset return distributions, rather than
in the center. This is in sharp contrast to a standard correlation analysis in (conditional)
means which cannot quantify spillovers in tail situations of financial distress, and also goes
beyond simple descriptive correlations between tails. Tail correlations do not allow detect-
ing causal dependencies between tails and do not permit forecasting systemic risk contri-
butions. We consider a stress-test-type scenario for assessing how changes in individual
company-specific risk affect the risk of failure of the entire system given underlying net-
work dependencies between institutions and market externalities at the respective point in
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time. Therefore, our model does not feature a general equilibrium framework, but is ex-
clusively designed to provide a practically feasible and reliable measure of a company’s
marginal contribution to systemic risk in the presence of risk spillovers from other compa-
nies. These underlying network linkages between tail risks of firms in the system must be
identified in a first step.
Defining the company-specific asset return as Xit, we measure the tail risk of a company
as its conditional Value-at-Risk (VaR), VaRip,t, given a set of company-specific tail risk
drivers W(i)t containing network influences from other institutions in the system, i.e.,
Pr(−Xit ≥ VaRip,t|W
(i)




t ) = p (2.1)




t ) = −Qip,t denoting the (negative) conditional p-quantile of
Xit.
5 Likewise, system risk, VaRsp,t, is measured as the conditional VaR of the system return
Xst obtained as the value-weighted average return of the set of all major financial compa-
nies.6 To measure the systemic impact of company i, the system VaR is modeled in depen-







−Qsp,t. Then, we define the systemic risk beta as the marginal effect of firm i’s tail risk on








We classify the systemic relevance of institutions according to the statistical significance of
β
s|i
p,q and the size of their total effect β
s|i
p,qVaRiq,t. We define the latter as a firm’s realized
systemic risk contribution raising with the system’s marginal exposure to the company’s tail
risk (measured by βs|ip,q) and the firm’s VaRiq,t. Changes in systemic relevance over time,
however, cannot only occur through VaRiq,t but also through the systemic risk beta β
s|i
p,q
which we allow to vary in firm-specific characteristics (see Section 2.4).7 Note that this is
conceptionally different to CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
As the VaR is not observable and has to be estimated, a major challenge is to select
appropriate significant conditioning variables W(i)t yielding a flexible but still parsimonious
model specification. We determine the relevant i-specific tail risk drivers out of a large set
of potential regressors Wt containing lagged macroeconomic state variables Mt−1, lagged
5Defining VaR as the negative p-quantile ensures that the Value-at-Risk is positive and is inter-
preted as a loss position.
6For details, see Section 2.2.2.
7For ease of illustration, here we skip the time index in βs|ip,q.
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firm-specific characteristics Cit−1, the i-specific lagged return Xit−1, and influences of all
other companies apart from i, E−it = (E
j
t)j 6=i, by a statistical selection technique as dis-
cussed in the remainder of the chapter. We find that these intra-system influences are best
captured via contemporaneous loss exceedances, where the loss exceedance of a firm j is






0.1) and Q̂0.1 is the unconditional 10% sample quantile of
X j. Hence, company j only affects the VaR of company i if the former is under pressure.
Since E−it are return realizations and VaR
i
t is a future predicted quantity, this specification
furthermore circumvents simultaneity issues. A model for VaRit based on economic state
variables as well as loss exceedances by construction automatically adjusts and prevails
in distress scenarios under shocks in externalities. This is a clear advantage compared to
pure time series approaches (cp. e.g. White, Kim, and Manganelli (2012), and Brownlees
and Engle (2012)), which also drives the empirically convincing results in our validity case
study in Section 2.5. These clearly reveal that systemic risk beta could have served as a
valuable monitoring tool for prudent bail-out decisions of regulation authorities before the
crisis.
The selection step allows identifying which (and how strongly) loss exceedances of
other companies influence VaRip,t and is crucial for accounting for network dependencies
between companies. As demonstrated in the sequel of the chapter, the latter are crucial for
appropriately explaining individual tail risks. Moreover, identifying cross-firm dependen-
cies for each company i is not only essential for appropriately capturing firm-specific VaRs
in a first step but is also crucial for selecting necessary control variables in the estimation
of βs|ip,q in the second step. In particular, for an unbiased estimate of β
s|i
p,q, it is necessary to
control for any tail risk drivers influencing both VaRsp,t and VaR
i
q. Accordingly, Vt must
contain macroeconomic state variables as well as the tail risks (represented by the VaRs) of
all companies which are identified to influence company i. Ignoring these spillover effects
would lead to a biased measure of systemic risk contribution.
The identified risk connections between all firms constitute a systemic risk network.
The latter is not only a prerequisite for the quantification of marginal systemic risk contri-
butions but contains additional valuable regulatory information on potential risk channels
and specific roles of companies as risk transmitters and/or recipients. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing analysis consists of two steps where in the first step firm-specific VaRs and network
effects are quantified (Section 2.3) before in the second step, systemic risk betas are esti-
mated while controlling for the (pre-)identified cross-company dependencies (Section 2.4).
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2.2.2 Data
Our analysis focuses on publicly traded U.S. financial institutions. The list of included
companies in Table 2.A.1 comprises depositories, broker dealers, insurance companies and
others.8 To assess a firm’s systemic relevance, we use publicly available market and bal-
ance sheet data. Such data constitutes a solid basis for transparent regulation since timely
access on detailed information of connections between firms’ assets and obligations, is very
difficult and expensive to obtain – even for central banks.
Daily equity prices are obtained from Datastream and are converted to weekly log re-
turns. To account for the general state of the economy, we use weekly observations of seven
lagged macroeconomic variables Mt−1 as suggested and used by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011) (abbreviations as used in the remainder of the chapter are given in brackets): the
implied volatility index, VIX, as computed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (vix),
a short term “liquidity spread”, computed as the difference of the 3-month collateral repo
rate (available on Bloomberg) and the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (repo), the change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate (yield3m) and the
change in the slope of the yield curve, corresponding to the spread between the 10-year
and 3-month Treasury bill rate (term). Moreover, we utilize the change in the credit spread
between BAA rated bonds and the Treasury bill rate (both at 10 year maturity) (credit), the
weekly equity market return from CRSP (marketret) and the one-year cumulative real estate
sector return, computed as the value-weighted average of real estate companies available in
the CRSP data base (housing).
Moreover, to capture characteristics of individual institutions predicting a bank’s propen-
sity to become financially distressed, Cit−1, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and
use (i) leverage, calculated as the value of total assets divided by total equity (in book val-
ues) (LEV), (ii) maturity mismatch, measuring short-term refinancing risk, calculated as
short term debt net of cash divided by the total liabilities (MMM), (iii) the market-to-book
value, defined as the ratio of the market value to the book value of total equity (BM), (iv)
market capitalization, defined by the logarithm of market valued total assets (SIZE) and
(v) the equity return volatility, computed from daily equity return data (VOL). The system
return is chosen as the return on the financial sector index provided by Datastream. It is
computed as the value-weighted average of prices of 190 U.S. financial institutions.
As balance sheets are available only on a quarterly basis, we interpolate the quarterly
data to a daily level using cubic splines, and then aggregate them back to calendar weeks.
8Companies are distinguished according to their two-digit SIC codes, following the categoriza-
tion in Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2012).
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We focus on 57 financial institutions existing through the period from beginning of 2000
to end of 2008, resulting into 467 weekly observations on individual returns. This restric-
tion has the drawback of excluding companies which defaulted during the financial crisis.
Therefore, to address this issue and to validate and robustify our approach, we re-estimate
the model over a sub-period ending before the financial crisis and including, among others,
the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch that were massively affected by
the crisis.
2.3 A tail risk network
2.3.1 Measuring firm-specific tail risks
Identification of tail risk drivers
Specifying the VaR of firm i at time point t = 1, . . . , T as a linear function of the i-specific
tail risk drivers W(i)t ,
VaRiq = W
(i) ′ξiq , (2.3)











t ) = 0. (2.4)
If we knew the i-relevant risk drivers W(i) selected out of W, then, estimates ξ̂iq of ξ
i
q could



























However, the relevant risk drivers W(i) for firm i are unknown and must be determined from
W in advance. Model selection is not straightforward in the given setting as tests on the
individual significance of single variables do not account for the (possibly high) collinear-
ity between the covariates. Moreover, sequences of joint significance tests have too many
possible variations to be easily checked in case of more than 60 variables. Since alter-
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native model selection criteria, like the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) or the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), are not available in a quantile setting, we choose the relevant
covariates in a data-driven way by employing a statistical shrinkage technique known as the
least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO). LASSO methods are standard for
high-dimensional conditional mean regression problems (see Tibshirani (1996)), and have
recently been adapted to quantile regression by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Accord-
























σ̂k|ξ ik| , (2.7)





t=1(Wt,k)2 and the loss function ρq as in (2.5). The key idea is to select relevant
regressors according to the absolute value of their respective estimated marginal effects
(scaled by the regressor’s variation) in the penalized VaR regression (2.7). Regressors are
eliminated if their shrunken coefficients are sufficiently close to zero. Here, all firms in
W with absolute marginal effects |ξ̃i| below a threshold τ = 0.0001 are excluded keep-
ing only the K(i) remaining relevant regressors W(i). Hence, LASSO de-selects those
regressors contributing only little variation. Due to the additional penalty term in (2.7), all
coefficients ξ̃
i
q are generally downward biased in finite samples. Therefore, we re-estimate
the unrestricted model (2.5) only with the selected relevant regressors W(i) yielding the
final estimates ξ̂iq. This post-LASSO step produces finite sample estimates of coefficients
ξiq which are superior to the original LASSO estimates or plain quantile regression results
without penalization suffering from overidentification problems (see the original paper by
Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) for consistency of the post LASSO step).
The selection of relevant risk drivers via LASSO crucially depends on the choice of the
company-specific penalty parameter λi. The larger λi, the more regressors are eliminated.
Conversely, in case of λi = 0, we are back in the standard quantile regression setting (2.5)
without any de-selection. For each institution, we determine the appropriate penalty level
λi in a completely data-driven way such that it dominates a relevant measure of noise in the
sample criterion function. In particular, we use the supremum norm of a suitably rescaled
gradient of the sample criterion function evaluated at the true parameter value as in Belloni
and Chernozhukov (2011). In this sense, number and elements of the set of relevant risk
drivers are determined only from the data without any restrictive pre-assumptions. For
details on the empirical procedure we refer to Appendix 2.A.1.
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Evaluating the goodness of fit of conditional VaR model specifications should take into
account how well the model captures the specific percentile of the return distribution but
also how well the model predicts size and frequency of losses. The latter issue cannot
be captured, e.g., by quantile-based modifications of the conventional R2. We therefore
consider a VaR specification as inadequate if it either fails producing the correct empirical
level of VaR exceedances but also if the sequence of exceedances is not independently and
identically distributed over the considered time period. This proceeding ensures that VaR
violations today do not contain information about VaR violations in the future and both
occur according to the same distribution. This is formally tested using a likelihood ratio
(LR) version of the dynamic quantile (DQ) test developed in Engle and Manganelli (2004)
and described in detail in Appendix 2.A.1. Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier (2011)
show that this likelihood ratio (LR) test has superior size and power properties compared to
competing conditional VaR backtesting methods which dominate plain unconditional level
tests (as e.g. Kupiec (1995)).
Empirical evidence
We estimate VaR specifications with q = 0.05 for all companies employing the LASSO
selection procedure described in Section 2.3.1.9 Exemplary VaRi (post-)LASSO regression
results for firms in the four industrial sectors depositories, insurances, brokers and others
are provided in Table 2.A.2.
The main drivers of company-specific VaRs are loss exceedances of other firms. In their
presence, macroeconomic variables and firm-specific characteristics often do not have any
statistically significant influence and are not selected by the LASSO procedure. In Table
2.A.2, only for Torchmark (TMK) and Regions Financial (RF) regressors other than cross-
firm links are selected. In contrast, VaR specifications of Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan
Stanley (MS), JP Morgan (JPM) and AIG exclusively contain loss exceedances from other
firms. Particularly the connections between close competitors, such as Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley and the influence of mortgage company Freddie Mac (FRE) on AIG
correspond are highly plausible and are confirmed by market evidence. The relevance of
cross-firm effects is additionally robustified by testing for the joint significance of the indi-
vidually selected loss exceedances E−it . This is performed based on a quantile regression
version of the F-test of linear hypothesis developed by Koenker and Bassett (1982). We
find that the selected tail risk spillovers are highly significant in all but very few cases. See
9Due to the limited number of observations, we refrain from considering more extreme probabil-
ities.
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Table 2.A.3 for an overview of all cross-effects.
The importance of including other companies’ loss exceedances as potential risk drivers
for a company i is also illustrated by a simple comparison of the performance of our
LASSO-selected specifications to a model of VaRi only using macroeconomic variables
as in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011). According to the employed backtests, specifications
allowing for cross-firm dependencies reveal a strong predictive ability and are significantly
superior to simplistic models including macroeconomic regressors only. Figure 2.3 shows
the distributions of the backtesting p-values implied by both models. Hence, inter-company
linkages do not only add crucial explanatory power in VaR specifications but in fact contain



















Figure 2.3: Boxplots of backtesting p-values indicating the in-sample model fit of VaR spec-
ifications including macroeconomic regressors only (left) and VaR specifications resulting
from the LASSO selection procedure (2.7) (right).
Our results show that the major information about cross-company dependencies in tail
risks is primarily contained in contemporaneous loss exceedances E−it . In contrast, alterna-
tive VaR specifications utilizing corresponding returns X−jt or lagged loss exceedances E
−i
t−1
imply significantly inferior backtest performances with the regressors being mostly not sig-
nificant in joint F-tests.10 Moreover, linking VaR forecasts and thus predictions of hypo-
thetical losses to already realized loss exceedances allows measuring mutual dependencies
between companies without requiring a simultaneous system of equations in conditional
quantiles. In particular, observed bi-directional relationships between conditional quantiles
and realized loss exceedances of different firms (e.g., between Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley) do not reflect simultaneities as feedbacks are not contemporaneous: For instance,
10All F-test results are available upon request and omitted here for sake of brevity.
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a highly negative (realized) return of company j increases the conditional loss quantile and
therefore increases the VaR of firm i. However, a higher conditional VaR of i does not nec-
essarily directly increase the absolute realized loss return of i but just makes it more likely.
Avoiding an explicit treatment of simultaneities in quantiles while still addressing network
dependencies is an important advantage of our approach.11
2.3.2 Network model and structure
We constitute a tail risk network of the system from individually selected loss exceedances
reflecting cross-firm dependencies. Taking all firms as nodes in such a network, there is an
influence of firm j on firm i, if Ej is LASSO-selected in (2.7) as a relevant risk externality
of firm i in VaRiq. In particular, if Ej is part of W
(i) as its k-th component, then the corre-
sponding coefficient ξ iq,k in ξ
i
q marks the risk impact of firm j on firm i in the network. If E
j
is not selected as relevant risk driver of firm i, there is no arrow from firm j to firm i.
For each company in the system, the network builds on only directly influencing and
influenced firms and all other companies directly influencing the influenced firms. In the
Bayesian network literature, these constitute a so-called Markov blanket assumed to contain
all relevant information for predicting the node’s role in the network (see Friedman, Geiger,
and Goldszmidt (1997)). An overview of the identified tail risk connections between all
companies is provided in Table 2.A.3, reporting which company’s loss exceedance affects
which others’ VaR and vice versa. We observe that the number of risk connections substan-
tially varies over the cross-section of companies. While some firms such as, e.g., Morgan
Stanley, Bank of America (BAC), American Express (AXP) as well as Bank of New York
Mellon (BK), are strongly inter-connected with many other companies, there are institu-
tions, such as Fannie Mae (FNM), AIG (AIG) and a couple of further insurances revealing
significantly less cross-firm dependencies. In order to effectively illustrate identified risk
connections and directions, we graphically depict the resulting network of companies in
Figure 2.4. The layout and allocation of the network is chosen such that the sum of cross-
firm distances are minimized. Consequently, the most connected firms are located in the
center of the network while the less involved companies are placed at its boundary.
11Econometrically it is open how to handle such a system in conditional quantiles in general. In
contrast to relations in (conditional) means, it is unclear how marginal q-quantiles constitute the
respective quantile in the joint distribution under appropriate independence assumptions. Only in
lags, restricted to very small dimensions and under strong assumptions, solutions have been obtained






























































































































































































































































The resulting network topology reveals different roles of companies within the financial
network. We distinguish between three major categories: The first group contains compa-
nies with only few incoming arrows but numerous outgoing ones, which thus mainly act as
risk drivers within the system. These are institutions whose potential failure might affect
many others but, conversely, which are themselves relatively unaffected by the distress of
other firms. Risk management of such firms can therefore be based mostly on idiosyncratic
criteria without accounting too much for influences of the system. For regulatory author-
ities, however, a close monitoring is important as a failure of such a company can induce
substantial systemic risks through multiple channels into the financial network. Our results
show that only few firms belong to this category. Examples are State Street Corporation
(STT), one of the top ten U.S. banks, Leucadia National Corporation (LUK), a holding
company which is, among others, engaged in banking, lending and real estate, and SEI
Investments Company (SEIC), a financial services firm providing products and service in
asset and investment management. Financial distress of these banks obviously has wide-
spread consequences. For instance, State Street reveals spillovers to the financial services
companies American Express and Northern Trust (NTRS), the Bank of New York Mellon
and Morgan Stanley. Leucadia affects Citigroup (C), one of the biggest banks in the U.S.,
and Freddie Mac, one of the two largest U.S. mortgage companies. Finally, SEI Investments
has links to various big institutions, such as Bank of America, American Express, Morgan
Stanley and the online broker TD Ameritrade (AMTD).
The second group contains companies which mainly are risk takers within the system.
These companies are not necessarily systemically risky but might severely suffer from dis-
tress of others and should account for such spillovers in their internal risk management.
According to Table 2.A.3 and Figure 2.4 these firms are primarily insurance companies.
Examples are Cincinnati Financial Corporation (CINF), a company for property and casu-
alty insurance, Humana Incorporation (HUM) managing health insurances or Progressive
Corporation Ohio (PGR) providing automobile insurance and other property-casualty insur-
ances.
The third group is the largest category within the network. It consists of companies
which serve as both risk recipients and risk transmitters which amplify tail risk spillovers
by further disseminating risk into new channels. Due to their role as risk distributors such
companies are key systemic players and should be supervised accordingly. We further dis-
tinguish between strongly and less connected firms. The first subgroup is the most difficult
but most important to regulate tightly. Examples are Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Morgan
Stanley, AON Corporation (AON), Bank of America, American Express, Freddie Mac as
well as the insurance company MBIA (MBI), among many others. Bank of America and
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Citigroup are among the five largest banks in the U.S. and reveal strong connections to var-
ious other big institutions, such as Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, American
Express, Regions Financial and AIG. Details on the specific role of Citigroup and Morgan
Stanley within the system are highlighted in Figure 2.A.1. Morgan Stanley, with strong
links to many companies, such as Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and the savings bank
Hudson City Bancorporation (HCBK), and the insurance company AON are examples for
deeply connected firms located in the center of the network. Likewise, Freddie Mac is
strongly involved and was particularly affected by the 2008 credit crunch in the mortgage
sector. Accordingly, also MBIA realized severe losses during the financial crisis due to in-
vestments in mortgage backed securities.
The second subgroup might be technically easier to monitor with companies revealing risk
connections with only very few other firms. Still, supervision is not less important than
for the first subgroup. Examples are Fannie Mae and AIG. Fannie Mae reveals significant
bilateral risk connections to its main competitor Freddie Mac. AIG holds significant po-
sitions in mortgage backed securities and as a consequence is closely connected to both
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Probably due to the same reason, we also observe bilateral
tail risk dependencies between AIG and MBIA. Even though their number of relevant risk
connections within the network is limited, such firms can still have a crucial overall impact
on the system. In case of the 2008 financial crisis, the dependence between Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae as well as their interaction with AIG had severe systemic consequences.
Figure 2.A.2 reveals that it is not sufficient to focus on sector-specific subnetworks
only. Indeed interconnectedness of institutions occurs to a large proportion between indus-
trial sectors. In these circle layout network graphs, companies are grouped according to
industries with risk outflows for each group being highlighted. We observe that tail risks
of depositories, insurances and others are relatively equally distributed among all other in-
dustry groups. Depositories are most strongly connected and also reveal the strongest tail
risk links among each other. This is in contrast to the other industries where cross-firm con-
nections within a group are less strong. Moreover, in contrast to other industry categories,
the risk outflow of broker dealers is clearly more concentrated. They particularly affect big
banks such as Bank of America and Citigroup as well as financial service companies such
as American Express or SEI. Only very few direct connections to insurance companies are
revealed.
Besides graphical illustration and inflow-outflow categorizations, standard network char-
acteristics can provide a more comprehensive picture of the interconnectedness and the role
of each node in the system. In Figure 2.5 we depict firms’ pagerank coefficient (see Brin
and Page (1998)) which does not plainly count links but empirically weights their impor-
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Figure 2.5: Pagerank coefficients based on the estimated tail risk network computed as in
Berkhin (2005) with ordering of institutions according to sectors. Colors and acronyms are
as in Figure 2.A.2.
Confirming the visual impression based on Figure 2.4, the most connected firms are Lin-
coln National Corporation, AON, Bank of America, TD Ameritrade and Morgan Stanley.
The graph confirms our finding above that depositories tend to be slightly stronger involved
than the other industry groups. Particularly insurances are seperated into a group of highly
connected firms, such as Lincoln National Corp., AON and MBI, and a group of companies
being less connected, such as AIG, Humana, Unum Group (UNM) and Cincinnati Financial
Corp.
Note that pagerank coefficients such as other network metrics can only assess the local
impact and centrality of firms in the network containing relevant but not all information
for judging overall systemic relevance. Therefore, a risk network does not allow to fully
quantitatively assess the systemic relevance of a financial institution. Nevertheless, the de-
gree of firms’ interconnectedness and the specific topology of the network or corresponding
sub-networks allows to identify possible risk channels in the system. These interlinkages
are central but not comprehensive for macroprudential regulation reflecting the particular
role of a firm as risk recipient, transmitter or distributor of tail risk. To explicitly quantify a
firm’s marginal systemic relevance, we propose the concept of systemic risk betas presented
12The key idea is to assign a weight to each node (i.e., a company in our context) which is in-
creasing with the number of connections to others and the relative importance thereof. The more
connected a firm is, the higher its importance and thus the higher the importance of its neighbor.
The computation of the pagerank coefficient can be understood as an eigenvalue problem which can
solved iteratively. For more details, see Berkhin (2005).
49
in the following section.
2.4 Quantifying systemic risk contributions
2.4.1 Measuring systemic risk betas
Besides valuable information on financial network structures, the focus of supervision au-
thorities is on an accurate but parsimonious measure of an institution’s systemic impact. We
quantify the latter as the effect of a marginal change in the tail risk of firm i on the tail risk
of the system given the underlying network structure of the financial system. In order to ob-
tain unbiased estimates of this specific marginal effect in the VaR regression of the system,
however, it is sufficient to additionally only control for firms which are relevant i-specific
risk drivers in the network. Conversely, variables unrelated to VaRi do not affect firm i’s
systemic risk contribution.13 Thus, a fully-fledged structural general equilibrium model is
not necessary. Even if correctly specified, an equilibrium setting would be practically in-
feasible failing to deliver sufficiently precise estimates given the high-dimensionality and
interconnectedness of the financial system on the one hand and the limited data availability
on the other.
For this reason, we propose estimating systemic risk contributions based on models
which are specific for each firm i as they only control for the i-specific risk drivers. Corre-
spondingly, we estimate the firm-i-specific systemic risk beta βs|iq,p based on a linear model








where the vector of regressors V(i)t = (1, Mt−1, VaR
(−i)
q,t ) includes a constant effect, lagged
macroeconomic state variables and the VaRs of all companies which are identified as risk
drivers for firm i via LASSO, see Section 2.3.
The systemic risk beta βs|ip,q = βs|i of company i captures the effect of a marginal change
in VaRit on VaR
s
t . It can be interpreted in analogy to an inverse asset pricing relationship
in quantiles, where bank i’s q-th return quantile drives the p-th quantile of the system given
network-specific effects and firm-specific and macroeconomic state variables.14 Accord-
13See Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Val (2006) for a simple Frisch-Waugh-type argu-
ment in quantile regressions.
14Note that our stress test scenario only studies the immediate effect of an exogenous risk shock
in company i for the system. We do not infer anything about further steps which should then also








measures the full partial effect of a tail risk increase of bank i on VaRst . We refer to β̄
s|i
p,q
as the realized systemic risk contribution as it is is computed based on market realizations
and is useful for real-time crisis monitoring. Moreover, scaling systemic risk betas by the
corresponding VaR allows to compare systemic risk contributions cross-sectionally, and to
rank banks according to their systemic relevance.
During periods of turbulence, not only banks’ risk exposures change, but also their
marginal importance for the system might vary. We therefore allow βs|i to be time-varying.
In particular, time-variation occurs through observable factors Zi characterizing a bank’s
propensity to get into financial distress. Accordingly, βs|it should be interpreted as a con-
ditional measure. To limit complexity and computational burden of the model, we assume












where ηs|ip,q are the parameters driving the time-varying effects. The case of a constant








We choose Zit = Cit as the firm-specific tail risk drivers since size, leverage, maturity
mismatch, book-to-market ratio and volatility might not only affect a bank’s VaR, but also
directly drive its marginal systemic relevance. As a consequence, systemic risk contribu-
tions of two companies with the same exposure to macroeconomic risk factors and financial
network spillovers may be still different as they depend on their balance sheet structures.
The significance of time variation in these quantities can then be statistically tested for (see
Section 2.4.3 below).
Due to the linearity of (2.10) we can thus write the quantile model (2.8) for VaRsp with















2.4.2 Estimation and inference
If firm specific VaRs were directly observable, the magnitude and significance of i-specific
systemic risk betas could be directly inferred from the linear quantile regression (2.11) in
analogy to (2.5) with the VaR defined by (2.1). However, note that the regressors VaRit and
VaR(−i)q,t in V
(i) are pre-estimated as they arise from the first-step quantile regressions as



























t−1) = 0 .
Using the notation V̂
(i)
, we stress that some components of V(i) are pre-estimated as V̂aR
(−i)
q .
Then, analogously to the first-step regressions in Section 2.3, parameter estimates are ob-
























in the unknown parameters. Consequently, the resulting estimate of the full time-varying











for given values Zit−1.
Since VaRiq,t is a function of W











t for all firms relevant for
company i appearing in V̂aR
(−i)
q,t . Hence, with both quantile regression steps being linear,
inserting (2.3) into (2.11) yields a full model for the system’s tail risk in observable charac-
teristics. However, direct one-step estimation is only feasible if the choice of W(i) and thus
VaR(−i)q,t is still determined in a pre-step from individual VaR regressions. Model selection
based on the full model of VaRs in observables is infeasible since correlation effects among
the huge number of regressors would produce unreliable results. Furthermore, individual
parameters βs|i0,p,q and η
s|i
p,q could not be identified without additional identification condition
Qq(εit|W
(i)
t ) = 0, implicitly bringing back the first-step estimation. Therefore we use two-
step estimation even if exact asymptotic confidence intervals are larger than for an (infeasi-
ble) single step procedure. In contrast to mean regressions, such results are non-standard in
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a quantile setting and are therefore provided in detail in Appendix 2.A.1. In finite samples,
however, asymptotic distributions often only provide a poor approximation to the true distri-
bution of the (scaled) difference between the estimator and the true value if sample sizes are
not sufficiently large. In case of quantile regressions, this effect is even more pronounced,
since valid estimates for the asymptotic variance have poor non-parametric rates and thus
require even larger sample sizes to obtain the same precision.
Therefore, we suggest a procedure for testing significance and potential time-variation











ρp(Xst − B′tξs), (2.15)
with the compound vector of all regressors in VaRs, Bt ≡ (VaRit, VaRit · Zit−1, V
(i)
t ), cor-
responding KB-parameter vector ξs, and Ω0 referring to the constrained set of parameters
under H0. This test is an adaptation to the quantile setting of a method proposed by Chen,
Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) for median regressions. Direct operationalization of the
test is complicated by the fact that the asymptotic distribution of (2.15) involves unknown
terms, and, secondly, by the nonsmooth objective function of the quantile regression, which
causes inconsistency of conventional resampling techniques. Therefore, following Chen,
Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) we apply an adjusted bootstrap method, which is described
in detail in Section 2.A.1.
2.4.3 Empirical evidence on systemic risk betas and risk rank-
ings
We estimate systemic risk betas according to (2.12) with time variation in firm-specific
characteristics (i.e. Zit = Cit). As in the first-step estimations, we choose q = 0.05, i.e.,
we model the loss which will not be exceeded with 95% probability. For notational conve-
nience, we suppress the quantile index as we set p = q. Obtained realized systemic risk
betas indeed contain information on systemic relevance beyond a company’s network inter-
connectedness. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6 revealing only slightly positive dependencies
between pagerank coefficients and realized systemic risk betas. Thus, more connected firms
tend to be systemically more risky, see e.g. , Bank of America and American Express. With
an R2 of 2% in the regression, the relationship, however, is not very strong indicating that
the quantification of a firm’s interconnectedness is not sufficient to assess its systemic rel-
evance which directly depends on firm-specific and macroeconomic conditions. The latter
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Figure 2.6: Pagerank coefficients are plotted versus realized systemic risk contributions for
all companies which are classified as systemically relevant for the years 2000-2008 as in
Section 2.4.3. The regression line shows only a small correlation between the pagerank
coefficent and the realized beta, supported by the respective R2 of 0.0265 of the regression.
Colors and acronyms are as in Figure 2.A.2.
We statistically assess if a company’s risk has a relevant direct impact on the system by
testing for the significance of the respective systemic risk beta. Evaluating whether βs|it = 0
requires testing for the joint significance of all variables driving a firm’s marginal impact.
Thus, we test the hypothesis











Whether marginal effects on the system are indeed time-varying in firm-specific character-
istics can be tested by the joint hypothesis













s|i, re-estimate the model without interaction variables and test the hypothesis
H3 : βs|i = 0 .
We find the majority of firms having a significant systemic risk beta which is classified
as being time-varying in approximately 50% of all cases. In contrast, for approximately
25% of all firms we do not find systemic risk betas which are significantly different from
54
zero. Table 2.A.4 reports the p-values of the respective underlying tests which are per-
formed using the wild bootstrap procedure illustrated in Section 2.A.1 based on 2, 000 re-
samples of the test statistic.15 We consider effects as significant if p-values are below 10%.
Then, a company is defined as systemically relevant if an increase in its possible loss po-
sition, given all economic state variables and i-specific risk inflows from other companies,
induces a significantly higher potential systemic loss. This requires its systemic risk beta to
be significant and nonnegative.16
Table 2.A.5 lists all systemically relevant companies for the period from 2000 to 2008,
ranked according to their average realized systemic risk contributions ˆ̄βs|i. JP Morgan,
American Express, Bank of America and Citigroup are identified as the (on average) most
systemically risky companies. According to our network analysis above, these firms are
categorized into the group of risk amplifiers which are strongly interconnected and should
be closely supervised. To judge the validity and quality of our assessment based on mar-
ket data, we compare our results with the outcomes of the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program (SCAP) conducted by the Federal Reserve in spring 2009, right after the end of
our sample period. In this analysis, the Fed could draw on detailed non-public confidential
balance sheet information to classify the 19 largest bank holding companies according to es-
timates of potential lack in capital buffer for covering risks under an adverse macro scenario.
For details, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2009). The financial
institution with the biggest potential lack of capital buffer according to the SCAP, Bank of
America, ranks among our highest systemically relevant companies leading the ranking in
June 2008 (Table 2.A.6 b). In addition, with Citigroup, FifthThird Bancorp, Morgan Stan-
ley, PNC, Regions Financial and Wells Fargo we identify six out of eight banks contained in
our database17 which, according to the SCAP results, were threatened by financial distress
under more adverse market conditions. As we could in advance detect systemic riskiness
of the majority of companies that were later found to face capital shortages in the stress test
scenario of the SCAP, this confirms the quality of our method, which is entirely based on
15Because of multi-collinearity of time variation effects in firm characteristics for systemic risk
betas, the interpretation of individual coefficients η might be misleading. Therefore, we refrain from
reporting respective estimates.
16 Since we do not impose a priori non-negativity restrictions, systemic risk betas can become
negative at certain points in time. In a few cases we can directly attribute these effects to sudden
time variations in one of the (interpolated) company-specific characteristics Zit−1 driving systemic
risk betas temporarily into the negative region. These effects might be reduced by linking βs|i in
(2.10) to (local) time averages of Zit−1. Such a proceeding would stabilize systemic risk betas but at
the cost of a potentially high loss of information.
17Due to a lack of data, we cannot include KeyCorp and GMAC in our analysis which also have
been found to be financially distressed in a critical macroeconomic environment.
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only publicly available data.
Average systemic risk betas, however, only provide a rough picture of systemic im-
portance as they aggregate companies’ marginal systemic risk contributions and VaRs over
time ignoring potential changes in the structure of the financial sector. In contrast, moni-
toring the evolution of systemic risk beta’s over time provides a more informative picture
on companies’ specific systemic importance and yields valuable feedback from the market
for forward-looking regulation. To illustrate the potential of our approach, we show the
rankings at two specific time points: Table 2.A.6a gives the systemic risk ranking for the
last week in March 2007, which was a relatively ”calm” time before the start of the financial
crisis. Table 2.A.6b, on the other hand, shows the ranking at the end of June 2008, shortly
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Comparing the pre-crisis and post-crisis rankings,
we observe clear changes. In most cases, systemic risk betas – and thus the magnitude
of systemic risk contributions – significantly increased during the crisis. This is particu-
larly observed for American Express, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Regions Financial and
State Street, among others. Nevertheless, in some cases, as, e.g., for Citigroup and Morgan
Stanley systemic risk contributions even declined.
During the crisis, we detect Bank of America as systemically most relevant. Our es-
timates indicate that its multiple risk channels in the center of the network, particularly to
Morgan Stanley, American Express, Citigroup, Wells Fargo are systemically critical. Figure
2.A.3 shows that Bank of America’s systemic risk beta has been relatively stable before the
financial crisis but significantly dropped after the issuance of the Federal Reserve’s rescue
packages. Nevertheless, its VaR and thus its realized systemic risk contribution strongly
increased during the crisis. Our results also identify AIG as highly systemically relevant.
Before the crisis, AIG was among the largest issuers and holders of credit default swaps
(CDS) and other credit securitization derivatives. Its obviously strong exposure to mort-
gage default risks is reflected by a strong dependence to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,
among others, as depicted in the network graph in Figure 2.4. The high systemic relevance
of AIG is illustrated in the upper part of Figure 2.A.3 depicting βs|it , VaR
i
t and the product
thereof, β̄s|it . In 2008, AIG faced tremendous write-downs which caused strong increases of
the firm’s VaR and the realized systemic risk contribution β̄s|it . The rescue packages from
the Federal Reserve amounting to USD 150 billion (see Schich (2009)) in September 2008,
however, significantly reduced the risk of both AIG’s and the entire system’s failure. This is
indicated by the strong decline of the companies’ systemic risk beta in Figure 2.A.3). Due
to the forward-looking character of systemic risk betas, the (anticipated) bailout has already
been incorporated in the systemic risk ranking of end of June 2009 where AIG drops out
of the list of systemically relevant companies. This is induced by strong changes in the
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companies’ book-to-market ratio driving the systemic risk beta of AIG into the negative
region.
By construction, realized systemic risk contributions β̄s|it might vary over time through
two channels: a time-varying beta, βs|it and a time-varying Value-at-Risk, VaR
i
t. For se-
lected companies, these effects are illustrated by Figure 2.2 in the introduction. In many
cases we observe increases of realized systemic risk contributions which are mainly due to
rising individual VaRs with systemic risk betas which even slightly decline from 2007 to
2008. Hence, companies’ marginal contribution to the system VaR is widely unchanged
while their exposure to idiosyncratic risk resulting from worse firm-specific and macroeco-
nomic conditions has been dramatically increased. See, for instance, the first two companies
in the 2008 ranking, Bank of America and American Express which, however, realize quite
different combinations of marginal systemic contributions and idiosyncratic tail risk levels
apparently facing different sources for systemic relevance. In both cases, the strong increase
in VaR can be attributed to tail risk spillovers in the network, with, e.g., Bank of America
being particularly affected by Citigroup and Morgan Stanley.
In several cases, increasing individual VaRs coincide with rising systemic risk betas.
For instance, Wells Fargo is an example of a company which was not even identified as
being systemically relevant in 2007 but faces a dramatic increase of both its systemic risk
beta and its idiosyncratic tail risk making it highly systemically risky in 2008. Likewise,
State Street, Progressive Ohio and Marshall & Isle (MI) face an increase of both βs|it and
VaRit. Also, sources for increasing effects can be found in the network structure. An
exception is State Street which does not face significant risk spillovers from other companies
and thus primarily depends on micro- and macroeconomic externalities. As a result, the
company’s high systemic relevance in 2008 is due to the combination of a moderately high
systemic risk beta and severe idiosyncratic risk, which in turn affects balance sheets and
obligations of other firms. For two central nodes in the network, Citigroup and Morgan
Stanley, however, declining systemic risk betas overcompensate increasing VaRs resulting
in declining systemic relevance.
The results illustrate that realized systemic risk contributions conveniently condense
information on banks’ systemic importance. Though, the underlying driving forces of a
bank’s changed systemic relevance can be quite different. Therefore, only simultaneously
analyzing and monitoring (i) network effects, (ii) sensitivity to micro- and macroeconomic
conditions and (iii) time-variations in systemic risk betas provide the full picture of compa-
nies’ specific role in the network and thus build a solid basis for regulatory measures.
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2.5 Validity: pre-crisis period
In the course of the financial crisis 2007–2009, a number of large institutions defaulted,
were overtaken by others or supported by the government. As for our general empirical
study, we required data for all considered institutions to be available over the entire period
from beginning of 2000 to end of 2008, some of these companies could not be included.
Nevertheless, to validate and robustify our findings, we perform an additional analysis by re-
estimating the model for the time period of January 1, 2000, to June 30, 2007 and including
the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.
Because of the shorter estimation period, differences between estimated systemic risk
contributions are not as pronounced as in the analysis covering the full time period. There-
fore, as a sharp ranking of companies might not be very meaningful and hard to interpret
in this context, Table 2.A.7 rather categorizes firms into groups according to quartiles of
the distribution of realized systemic risk betas. Accordingly, we can distinguish between
four broad classes: Firstly, there are 9 companies with VaRs that significantly influence the
system VaR and are among the 25% largest average realized betas. The most prominent
members of this group are AIG, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan and Gold-
man Sachs. The second group comprises systemically risky companies with significant
systemic impact, whose average realized betas lie in the third quartile of the distribution.
According to the estimates reported in Table 2.A.7, these magnitudes reflect a comparably
high systemic relevance.18 Group 2 group contains mainly large depositories and invest-
ment banks including Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup and Regions Financial,
but also the mortage company Freddie Mac. Group 3 includes all companies with small
but significant average systemic risk betas, in particular those below the median. Finally,
the ones which, according to the significance test, are not considered as being systemically
risky during the analyzed time period, are collected in Group 4.
In detail, we focus on four companies which were massively affected by the crisis:
Lehman Brothers became insolvent on September 15, 2008, and was liquidated afterwards.
Merrill Lynch announced a merger with Bank of America in September 2008, which was
executed on January 1, 2009. Furthermore, excluding the crisis period itself may reveal
the systemic relevance of the mortgage firm Freddie Mac, which is closely connected to
the second largest real estate financing company Fannie Mae. Both were placed under
conservatorship by the U.S. government during the course of the financial crisis. Finally,
it is interesting to investigate the systemic riskiness of AIG, which faced major distress
during the crisis and whose bailout was very expensive for the tax payers. As shown by
18For a better exposition, we multiply all values of realized systemic risk betas with 100.
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Table 2.A.7 (with the specific companies marked in bold), all of these firms belong to the
group of systemically relevant firms with high or mid-sized average systemic risk betas.
Table 2.A.8 summarizes the results of our empirical analysis for the four case study
candidates using only the pre-crisis data. Our network analysis reveals that almost all of
the companies are subject to loss spillovers from direct competitors: Freddie Mac is in-
fluenced by risk transmissions of Fannie Mae, and vice versa. Despite Fannie Mae’s low
average realized systemic risk beta, this direct bi-directional risk dependence reveals the
company’s systemic relevance. Merrill Lynch influences Citigroup (C). TD Ameritrade
Holding (AMTD) and E Trade Financial (ETFC) are large online brokers which operate
on the same market as Lehman and Merrill Lynch and are identified as significant tail risk
producer and receiver, respectively. Likewise, we identify tail risk dependencies between
Lehman and both Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, being Lehman’s main competitors
and the two largest investment banks in the U.S. during the estimation period. AIG is clearly
the most interconnected firm in this case study. Its VaR is affected by the tail risks of eight
competing insurers: Allstate (ALL), Chubb (CB), Hartford Financial (HIG), Lincoln Na-
tional Corp. (LNC), MBIA, Marsh & McLennan Inc. (MMC), and Torchmark (TMK) as
well as by Lehman Brothers (LEH). There are mutual spillovers with Citigroup, ETFC,
CNA, HIG, and MMC. Additionally, AIG’s losses have an effect on the VaRs of another
three insurance companies, Aflac (AFL), Humana (HUM) and Unum (UNM).
All four companies of interest have a significant impact on the system. Focussing partic-
ularly on Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, we show the time evolution of their realized
risk betas and VaRs in Figures 2.A.4 and 2.A.5, respectively. It turns out that the realized
systemic risk beta of Lehman steadily increases from 2005 to 2007. Interestingly, its VaR
only increases in the second half of 2005 but remains widely on the same level afterwards.
Hence, its growing systemic relevance is mainly due to rising marginal effects on the sys-
tem and is not reflected in Lehman’s idiosyncratic risk exposure. The jumps in the VaR
(and thus also in the realized risk beta) are induced by relevant loss exceedances which only
occur whenever one of Lehman’s tail risk drivers (e.g., Morgan Stanley) exceeds his (un-
conditional 10%) loss quantile. This discreteness reflects the company’s tail risk sensitivity
to loss exceedances of competitors.
In case of Merrill Lynch, we observe high fluctuations of the realized systemic risk beta
over the analyzed time period. As for Lehman Brothers, we observe clear differences in
the paths of our systemic risk measure and VaR. For example, while its VaR, apart from
some fluctuations keeps returning to the same level, its realized risk beta increases by more
than 100% from mid of 2006 to mid of 2007. Hence, the (realized) systemic risk beta again
reveals information on the company’s systemic importance which cannot be detected by
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an analysis of the VaR solely. This finding strongly backs the usefulness of our proposed
measure.
From these results, which are produced only from pre-crisis data, we can infer that in
June 2007, each of the five financial institutions of interest was classified as being relevant
for the stability of the U.S. financial system. Our findings indicate, firstly, that bailouts
during the crisis were justified for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG. Also a failure of
Merrill Lynch would have led to harsh systemic consequences which could be prevented by
its merger with Bank of America in 2008. Secondly, the increasing systemic importance of
Lehman Brothers could have been monitored and thus the impact of its bankruptcy could
have been anticipated to a certain extent. The direct bi-directional linkage to JP Morgan, as
well as the connections to Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, which in turn are deeply
interconnected, indicate a high risk for contagion as a result of Lehman’s failure. Further-
more, our estimates show that Lehman’s systemic risk contribution is only slightly lower
than that of AIG, while it is substantially higher than that of, e.g., Freddie Mac. Given these
results, bailing out the latter but not the former is not necessarily justifiable from a systemic
risk management point of view. If these results had existed in advance, more effective reg-
ulatory measures could have been performed which could have helped reducing the extent
of the financial crisis.
2.6 Conclusion
The worldwide financial crisis 2007–2009 has revealed that there is a need for a better
understanding of systemic risk. Particularly in situations of distress, it is the interconnect-
edness of financial companies which plays a major role, but also challenges quantitative
analysis and the construction of appropriate risk measures.
In this chapter, we propose a measure of firms’ systemic relevance which accounts for
dependence structures within the financial network given market externalities. Our analysis
allows to statistically identify relevant channels of potential tail risk spillovers between
firms, constituting the topology of the financial network. Based on these relevant company-
specific risk drivers, we measure a firm’s idiosyncratic tail risk by explicitly accounting for
its interconnectedness with other institutions. Our measure for a company’s systemic risk
contribution quantifies the impact on the system’s risk of distress induced by an increase
in the risk of the specific company in a network setting. Both measures exclusively rely
on publicly observable balance sheet and market characteristics and, thus, can be used for
prudent regulatory decisions in a stress test scenario.
Our empirical results show the interconnectedness within the U.S. financial system and
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clearly mark channels of relevant potential risk spillovers. In particular, we can classify
companies into major risk producers, transmitters or recipients within the system. More-
over, at any specific point in time, firms can be ranked according to their estimated contri-
bution to systemic risk given their role and position in the network. Monitoring companies’
systemic relevance over time, thus allows to detect those firms which are most central for
the stability of the system. In a case study, we highlight that our approach could have served
as a solid basis for sensible forward-looking regulation before the start of the financial crisis
in 2007.
Our approach is readily extendable in several directions. In particular, although the
financial system is dominated by the U.S, it truly is a global business with many firms op-
erating internationally. Detecting inter- and intra-country risk connections and measuring
firms’ global systemic relevance, should be straightforward with our proposed methodol-
ogy. Moreover, whenever additional (firm-specific or market-wide) information is available
as, e.g., reported to central banks, it can be directly incorporated into our measurement pro-
cedure. The data-driven selection step of relevant risk drivers then determines if and how it




Asymptotic results for two-step quantile estimation
Under the adaptive choice of penalty parameter as described in the text, the LASSO selec-
tion method is consistent with rate OP(
√
K(i)
T log(max(K, T)), and with high probability
the coefficients selected of W, contain the the true coefficients also in finite samples. These
results follow directly from Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Furthermore, VaRi is con-
sistently estimated by the post-LASSO method described in the text which re-estimates the
unrestricted model with W(i). In particular, for all q ∈ I with I ∈ (0, 1) being compact,
ξ̂
i





since in our setting it is safe to assume that the number of wrongly selected components
of W is stochastically bounded by the number K(i) of components of W contained in the
true model for VaRi (see equation (2.16) in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)). We write
in a slight abuse of notation YT ≤ OP(rT), with YT being either OP(rT) or even oP(rT) for
any random sequence YT and deterministic rT → 0. Note that in general for T → ∞, both
K and K(i) might grow only extremely slowly in T, such that they can be treated close to
being constants implying the standard oracle bound OP(
√
log(T)
T ) in (2.A.1).
If the true model is selected, we find for the asymptotic distribution of the individual


















where g(G−1(q)) denotes the density of the corresponding error εi distribution at the qth
quantile. This result is standard (see Koenker and Bassett (1978)). For the second step
estimates, we derive the asymptotic distribution analogously to the two-step median results
19Required assumptions of Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) and quantile analogies to Powell














































where in the scalar factor, f (F−1(p)) is the density of the corresponding error εs at the







p,q). The remaining main part Q in the variance is given by Q = H′E[AA′]H
with A = (W(i), vec(Zt−1 ·W(i)
′
), VaR(−i)). Denote by I and 0 identity and null matrices,
respectively, and by 1 a vector of ones of appropriate dimension. Then,
H′ =

diag(ξiq,2) 0 · · · 0 · · · · · · 0 · · ·
0 diag(ξiq,1) · · · 0 · · · · · · 0 · · ·




)) · · · 0 · · ·
I 0 · · · 0 · · · · · · 0 · · ·
0 0 · · · 0 · · · Id(−i)×d(−i)

where dZ is the dimension of Z which is 5 in our application, d(−i) is the dimension of
VaR(−i)t , and coefficients ξ
i
q,2 are those components of ξ
i
q for regressors which appear both
in the first and the second step. Correspondingly, ξiq,1 are coefficients of regressors which
just appear in the first step of the individual VaR regression. Note that in the variance matrix
there is a distinction in γ for parts of V which are also controls in VaRi and VaR(−i)t , which
just appear in VaRs.
Choice of the company-specific LASSO penalty parameter λi
We determine λi in a data-driven way following a bootstrap type procedure as suggested by
Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011):
Step 1 Take T iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of W1, . . . , WT denoted as U1, . . . , UT.
Conditional on observations of W, calculate the corresponding value of the random
variable,




∣∣∣∣∣ T∑t=1 Wt,k(q− I(Ut ≤ q))σ̂k√q(1− q)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Step 2 Repeat step 1 for B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of Λi condi-
tional on W through Λi1, . . . , Λ
i
B. For a confidence level α ≤ 1/K in the selection,
set
λi = c ·Q(Λi, 1− α|Wt),
where Q(Λi, 1− α|Wt) denotes the (1− α)-quantile of Λi given Wt and c ≤ 2 is a
constant.
The choice of α is a trade-off between a high confidence level and a corresponding high reg-
ularization bias from high penalty levels in (2.7). As in the simulation results in Belloni and
Chernozhukov (2011), we choose α = 0.1, which suffices to get optimal rates of the post-
penalization estimators below. Finally, the parameter c is selected in a data-dependent way
such that the in-sample predictive ability of the resulting VaR specification is maximized.
(Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) proceed in a similar way). The latter is evaluated in
terms of its best backtesting performance according to the procedure described below.
Backtest for the model fit for VaRi
As suggested by Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier (2011), for each institution i, we
measure VaR exceedances as Iit ≡ I(Xit < −VaRiq,t). If the chosen model is correct, then,
E[Iit |Ωt] = q , (2.A.5)
where Ωt is the information set up to t. The VaR is estimated correctly, if independently for
each day of the covered period, the probability of exceeding the VaR equals q. Similar to
Engle and Manganelli (2004), Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) and Taylor (2008), we
include a constant, three lagged values of It and the current VaR estimate in the information
set Ωt. Then, condition (2.A.5) can be checked by estimating a logistic regression model
Iit = α + A
′
tθ+ Ut,







′. Denote by Īi the sample mean of the
binary response Iit and define Flog(·) as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic
distribution. Then, under the joint hypothesis
H0 : α = q and θ1 = · · · θ4 = 0,
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the asymptotic distribution of the corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic is
LR = −2(lnLr − lnLu)
a∼ χ25 . (2.A.6)
Here, lnLu = ∑nt=1
[
Iit ln Flog(α + A
′
tθ) + (1− Iit) ln
(
1− Flog(α + A′tθ)
)]
is the unre-
stricted log likelihood function which under H0 simplifies to lnLr = nĪi ln(q) + n(1−
Īi) ln(1− q).
Bootstrap procedure for the joint significance test











ρp(Xst − B′tξs), (2.A.7)
involves the probability density function of the underlying error terms and is not feasible.
Furthermore, bootstrapping ST directly would yield inconsistent results. Therefore, we re-






























c denotes the constrained estimate of ξ
s, and {wt} is a sequence of standard expo-
nentially distributed random variables, having both mean and variance equal to one. Ac-
cording to Chen, Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008), the empirical distribution of S∗T provides
a good approximation of the distribution of ST. Thus, if the test statistic ST exceeds some
large quantile of the re-sampling distribution of S∗T, the null hypothesis is rejected.
The proposed testing method does not require re-sampling of observations but is en-
tirely based on the original sample. This provides significant gains in accuracy in the two-
step regression setting as opposed to standard pairwise bootstrap techniques as a further
alternative. A pre-analysis shows that this wild bootstrap type procedure is valid in the pre-
sented form as any serial dependence in the data is sufficiently captured by the regressors in
the reduced-form relation not requiring block-bootstrap techniques.20
20Pairwise block-bootstrap yields block lengths of one according to the standard procedure of
Lahiri (2001). Results are available upon request.
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Name pvH1 pvH2 (pvH3)
Companies with significant and time-varying βs|it
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.001 0.006
AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.002 0.000
BANK OF AMERICA 0.002 0.001
CHARLES SCHWAB 0.019 0.013
CHUBB 0.017 0.015
CIGNA 0.001 0.013
CINCINNATI FINL. 0.010 0.004
CITIGROUP 0.026 0.066
COMERICA 0.016 0.020
FANNIE MAE 0.001 0.000
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.039 0.021
FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.028 0.030
FREDDIE MAC 0.098 0.092
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.001 0.001
HUDSON CITY BANC. 0.043 0.035
HUNTINGTON BCSH. 0.010 0.011
LEGG MASON 0.026 0.060
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.041 0.016
LINCOLN NAT. 0.062 0.026
M & T BK. 0.033 0.021
MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.003 0.002
MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.020 0.019
MORGAN STANLEY 0.041 0.095
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.012 0.012
PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.007 0.003
REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.034 0.029
STATE STREET 0.054 0.049
T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.090 0.076
TORCHMARK 0.002 0.001
UNION PACIFIC 0.040 0.035
UNUM GROUP 0.079 0.097
W R BERKLEY 0.007 0.037
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.015 0.027
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.095 0.100
Companies with significant but constant βs|i
AON 0.063 0.192 (0.135)
E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.072 0.160 (0.233)
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 0.014 0.237 (0.047)
NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.040 0.132 (0.088)
SEI INVESTMENTS 0.014 0.115 (0.025)
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING 0.049 0.131 (0.188)
Companies with insignificant βs|i
AFLAC 0.220 -
ALLSTATE 0.114 -
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 0.199 -
BB &T 0.120 -
CNA FINANCIAL 0.410 -
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.257 -
EATON VANCE NV. 0.276 -
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. 0.667 -




NORTHERN TRUST 0.305 -
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL 0.105 -
SLM 0.391 -
SUNTRUST BANKS 0.213 -
SYNOVUS FINL. 0.289 -
Table 2.A.4: p-values for the test on significance of systemic risk betas (Hypothesis H1) and for
the test on constancy of systemic risk betas (Hypothesis H2). For the second panel, we include in
parentheses the p-values for the test on significance of systemic risk betas in case H1 is rejected but








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a) End of March 2007 (before the beginning of the financial crisis)
Rank Name ̂̄βs|i2007 · 102 β̂s|i2007 V̂aRi2007
1 CITIGROUP 1.78∗ 0.263 0.068
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 1.35∗ 0.387 0.035
3 BANK OF AMERICA 1.16∗ 0.304 0.038
4 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 1.05 0.265 0.040
5 MORGAN STANLEY 1.01∗ 0.146 0.069
6 LEGG MASON 0.98∗ 0.205 0.048
7 MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.83∗ 0.222 0.037
8 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.78∗ 0.202 0.038
9 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.77∗ 0.248 0.031
10 CHUBB 0.74∗ 0.240 0.031
11 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.61∗ 0.143 0.043
12 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.60∗ 0.143 0.042
13 STATE STREET 0.51∗ 0.114 0.045
14 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.50∗ 0.104 0.048
15 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.42∗ 0.092 0.046
16 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.41 0.090 0.045
17 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.40∗ 0.088 0.045
18 TORCHMARK 0.39∗ 0.173 0.023
19 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.38∗ 0.099 0.039
20 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.26∗ 0.115 0.054
21 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.25∗ 0.042 0.060
22 FREDDIE MAC 0.23∗ 0.057 0.041
23 LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.19∗ 0.057 0.033
24 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.13∗ 0.026 0.050
25 FANNIE MAE 0.09∗ 0.019 0.049
26 UNUM GROUP 0.23∗ 0.045 0.051
27 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.06∗ 0.014 0.043
28 LINCOLN NAT. 0.04∗ 0.010 0.036
b) End of June 2008 (during the financial crisis)
Rank Name ̂̄βs|i2008 · 102 β̂s|i2008 V̂aRi2008
1 BANK OF AMERICA 2.86∗ 0.186 0.154
2 AMERICAN EXPRESS 2.78∗ 0.278 0.100
3 WELLS FARGO & CO 2.51∗ 0.186 0.135
4 MARSHALL & ILSLEY 2.31∗ 0.516 0.045
5 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 2.22 0.265 0.084
6 PROGRESSIVE OHIO 1.97∗ 0.380 0.052
7 LEGG MASON 1.96∗ 0.137 0.143
8 REGIONS FINANCIAL 1.86∗ 0.107 0.173
9 MARSH & MCLENNAN 1.76∗ 0.471 0.037
10 STATE STREET 1.44∗ 0.171 0.084
11 NY.CMTY.BANC. 1.12 0.090 0.125
12 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 1.09∗ 0.153 0.071
13 CHUBB 1.07∗ 0.176 0.061
14 TORCHMARK 1.00∗ 0.177 0.057
15 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.91∗ 0.149 0.060
16 CITIGROUP 0.90∗ 0.072 0.124
17 MORGAN STANLEY 0.61∗ 0.074 0.083
18 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.58∗ 0.058 0.100
19 UNUM GROUP 0.34∗ 0.033 0.104
20 UNION PACIFIC 0.27∗ 0.047 0.056
21 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.24∗ 0.012 0.201
22 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.17∗ 0.026 0.064
23 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.01∗ 0.001 0.102
Table 2.A.6: Rankings of relevant systemic risk contributions based on estimated realized
systemic risk betas (bold) at the specific point in time. Estimated systemic risk betas and
VaRs are listed in addition illustrating the different sources of variation. Estimates based on
time-varying betas are marked by ∗.
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Systemic risk contributions Companies
Group 1 ’high’ AIG, LEH, MS, JPM, GS,STT, CINF, LM, PBCT
Group 2 ’medium’ FRE, ML, BAC, C, RF, AXP, PNC,CNA, TROW, NTRS
Group 3 ’low’ FNM, WFC, EV, TMK, BBT, AFL, HUM, MI, CMA, BK,LNC, ALL, HNT, CB, CVH, SLM, ETFC
Group 4
AMTD, AON, BEN, CI, FITB, HBAN, HCBK, HIG, L, LUK,
MBI, MMC, MTB, NYB, PGR, SCHW, SEIC, SNV, STI, UNM,
UNP, WRB, ZION
Table 2.A.7: Group ranking of systemic risk contributions for the pre-crisis period 2000 -
mid 2007. The upper part, group 1 (’high’), contains companies with significant βs|it and
the highest quartile of significant betas: ˆ̄βs|iav · 100 ∈ [0.5, 1.3]. Group 2 refers to the third
quartile (’medium’) with ˆ̄βs|iav · 100 ∈ [0.03, 0.49] and Group 3 to realized systemic risk
betas lower than the median value (’small’), for which ˆ̄βs|iav · 100 < 0.01. Group 4 includes
companies not determined to be systemically risky during the estimation period, i.e., those
with insignificant systemic risk betas. Case study companies are marked in bold.
Name incluenced by main influences sign. av. ̂̄βs|it · 100 av. β̂s|it
FREDDIE AON, BBT, EV, FITB, FNM, HUM, MBI BBT, FNM 0.048 0.38 0.092∗
MERRILL AMTD, CB, CNA, HCBK, L, NYB, WRB C 0.051 0.03 0.030∗
LEHMAN AMTD, AON, BEN, GS, JPM, LM, LUK, MI, MS AIG, AXP, ETFC, JPM 0.041 0.79 0.176∗
AIG ALL, C, CB, CNA, ETFC, HIG, LEH, LNC, MBI, AFL, C, CNA, HIG, 0.026 0.73 0.210∗
MMC, SCHW, STT, TMK HUM, MMC, UNM
∗ time-varying betas
Table 2.A.8: Summary of estimation and test results for the four case study companies: loss
exceedances influencing each company’s VaR, the most important other VaRs influenced,
joint significance tests on βs|it = 0 and estimated average systemic risk contributions and
betas. Estimation period: January 2000 - June 2007.
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Figure 2.A.1: Full Network graphs of Citigroup (C) and Morgan Stanley (MS) highlighting
risk drivers and risk recipients directly connected to the respective companies with bold
arrows according to the respective size of the effect. Arrows, colors and acronyms are as
in Figure 2.4. For simplicity, all other links just mark spillover effects without referring to




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.A.3: The upper three panels depict time-varying systemic risk betas, time-varying
VaRs and the product of the two, realized systemic risk betas, for American International
Group (AIG). The lower three panels show the respective three time series for Bank of
America (BAC).
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Figure 2.A.4: Realized systemic risk betas, i.e., the products of estimated systemic risk
betas and individual VaRs, of Lehman Brothers (LEH, red) and Merrill Lynch (ML, green).





























Figure 2.A.5: Estimated company-specific VaRs of Lehman Brothers (upper panel) and




Forecasting systemic impact in
financial networks
This chapter is based on Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2012b).
3.1 Introduction
The breakdown risk for the financial system induced by the distress of an individual firm
has long been neglected in financial regulation. Up to the financial crisis 2007–2009, this
systemic risk has been exclusively attributed to the idiosyncratic risk of an institution, ab-
stracting from the strong network cross-dependencies in the financial sector causing po-
tential risk spillover effects. In an extensive study for the U.S. financial system, however,
Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that it is mainly the interconnectedness within the financial
sector that determines the systemic relevance of a particular firm. To quantify the systemic
impact of an individual company, the so-called realized systemic risk beta is proposed,
which is the total effect of a company’s time-varying Value at Risk (VaR) on the VaR of the
entire system. Firms’ tail risk is determined from company-specific relevant factors among
other companies’ tail risks, individual balance sheet characteristics, and financial indicators,
where components are selected as being “relevant” via a data-driven statistical regulariza-
tion technique. The resulting individual-specific models give rise to a financial risk net-
work, capturing exposures of financial firms towards the distress of others. These network
risk spill-over channels contain important information for supervision authorities as sources
for systemic risk. The data-driven determination of firms’ systemic relevance from publicly
available data distinguishes the realized systemic risk beta from the number of other re-
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cently proposed methods for refined measurement and prediction of systemic risk, see, e.g.,
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), White, Kim, and Manganelli (2012), Huang, Zhou, and
Zhu (2009), Brownlees and Engle (2012), Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson
(2012), Giesecke and Kim (2011), Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012), Koopman,
Lucas, and Schwaab (2011), Engle, Jondeau, and Rockinger (2012), or Schwaab, Koopman,
and Lucas (2001) among many others.
Effective regulation requires models which can be used for forecasting and which are re-
liable even if estimation periods are short. The framework developed in Chapter 2, however,
is not tailored to short-term forecasting of systemic risk and must be adapted for prediction
purposes. Firstly, the systemic risk network is static, i.e., it is estimated once using the en-
tire dataset and then forms the basis for estimation of respective time-varying realized betas.
However, empirical evidence suggests that network links might change over time, especially
in crisis periods. Secondly, in order to exploit additional variation, quarterly balance sheet
characteristics are interpolated by cubic splines over the analyzed time period. Therefore,
out-of-sample forecasting is not possible. Thirdly, the penalty parameter required for the
model selection step is chosen such that a backtest criterion is optimized. VaR backtests,
however, generally rely on counting and analyzing VaR exceedances, which is reasonable
when the time series is long. Though, for short estimation periods, these tests should be
replaced by more adequate quantile versions of F-tests.
In this chapter, we extend the framework from the previous chapter to allow for flexible
systemic risk forecasting. The estimation period is shortened using rolling windows of only
one year of data. This excludes influences of back-dated events on current forecasts while
still pertaining sufficient prediction accuracy. The models are re-estimated each quarter,
resulting in time-varying systemic risk networks. Instead of interpolating, information on
firm-specific balance sheets is only updated when it is published at the end of each quarter.
The model selection penalty is chosen such that the in-sample fit in the respective annual
observation window is optimal. This is examined via an F-test for quantile regression. The
empirical analysis investigates systemic risk in Europe. The data set covers stock prices and
balance sheets of major European banks and insurance companies as well as financial in-
dicators, including country-specific variables, during the period around the recent financial
crisis. We illustrate that our approach could serve as a monitoring tool for regulators as it
captures and effectively predicts systemic relevance over time.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the forecast-
ing methodology and gives an algorithm for model selection and estimation of firm-specific
VaRs. Furthermore, the estimation method for realized systemic risk betas is given. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the dataset, before discussing estimation results and their implications in
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detail in Section 3.3.2. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Forecasting Methodology
Whereas Chapter 2 focuses on a single static network as a basis for estimating systemic im-
pact of financial institutions, we progress by determining time-varying networks in a fore-
casting setting. These allow capturing changing risk spillover channels within the system,
which are tailored to short-term forecasts from the model.
3.2.1 Time-Varying Networks
In a densely interconnected financial system, the tail risk of an institution i at a time point
t is determined not only by its own balance sheet characteristics Zit−1 and general market
conditions Mt−1 but also by indications for distress in closely related banks in the system.
For each bank in the system, we count a corresponding return observation as marking a dis-
tress event whenever this return is below the empirical 10% quantile. In such cases, these
extreme returns might induce cross-effects on the riskiness of other banks in the system.
We record these as so-called loss exceedances, i.e., the values of returns in case of an ex-
ceedance of the 10% quantile and zeros otherwise. Accordingly, the set of potential risk
drivers R for a bank i therefore comprises network impacts N−it from any other bank in the
system, where each component of N−it consists of loss exceedances for any bank but firm i
in the system.
We measure tail risk by the conditional Value at Risk, VaRi, for firm i and by VaRs
for the system, respectively. Using a post-LASSO technique, the large set of potential risk
drivers Rt = (Zit−1, Mt−1, N
−i
t ) for institution i can be reduced to a group of “relevant” risk
drivers R(i)t . Selected tail-risk cross-effects from other banks in the system constitute net-
work links from these banks to institution i. Repeating the analysis for all banks i in the sys-
tem, relevant risk channels can be depicted and summarized in a respective network graph.
The recent financial crisis, however, has shown that such network interconnections may
change over time, as the relevance of certain institutions for the risk of others might vary
substantially. Thus adequate short-run predictions of systemic importance should mainly
be based on current dependency structures. We address this issue by a time-dependent se-
lection of relevant risk drivers R(i,t)t according to the algorithm described below. Driven by
the quarterly publication frequency of companies’ balance sheet information we re-evaluate
the relevance of all potential risk drivers for each institution in the system at the beginning
of each quarter based on data from the respective previous year and incorporate the latest
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balance sheet news. We therefore obtain quarterly time-varying tail risk networks which
reflect the most current information of risk channels within the financial system. They are
tailored for short-term quarterly predictions of the systemic riskiness of firms in the system.
With the relevant risk drivers R(i,t) for firm i and time t in a specific quarter, individual







where coefficients ξ̂ are obtained in the post-LASSO step from quantile regression of Xi on
(1, R(i,t)) as part of the procedure described below.
Algorithm for selecting relevant risk drivers and determining their effects in
firms’ tail risk
We adapt the data-driven procedure of Chapter 2 (see the second paragraph in Section
2.A.1), to account for time-variation in tail risk networks and marginal systemic risk con-
tributions. Here, the automatic selection procedure is based on a sequential F-test instead
of a backtest criterion. For details on the tests on joint significance in quantile regression
settings, see e.g. Koenker (2005, Chapter 3) or Gutenbrunner, Jurečková, Koenker, and
Portnoy (1993). Determination of relevant risk drivers R(i,t0) at the beginning of a quarter
t0 uses information of observations within the previous year, the number of which we de-
note by τ. Hence, it is based on approximately 250 observations Rt0−τ, . . . , Rt0 , where each
Rt consists of centered observations of the potential regressors and has K dimensions. We
fix a ν-equidistant grid ∆c = {c1 > . . . > cl = c1 − ν(l − 1) > cL = 0} for values of a
constant c, where c1 is chosen such that the corresponding penalty parameter is sufficiently
large for selecting not more than one regressor into the model. For our purposes, we set
c1 = 30 and ν = 1.
Step 1: For each c ∈ ∆c, determine the penalty parameter λit0(c) from the data in the
following two sub-steps as in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011):
Step a) Take τ + 1 iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of Rt0−τ, . . . , Rt0 denoted as
U0, . . . , Uτ. Conditional on observations of R, calculate
Λit0 = (τ + 1) max1≤k≤K
1
τ + 1
∣∣∣∣∣ τ∑t=0 Rt0−t,k(q− I(Ut ≤ q))σ̂k√q(1− q)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Step b) Repeat step a) B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of Λit0 con-
ditional on R through Λit01, . . . , Λ
i
t0B. For a confidence level α = 0.1 in the
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selection, set
λit0(c) = c ·Q(Λ
i
t0 , 1− α|Rt0−t),
where Q(Λit0 , 1− α|Rt0−t) denotes the (1− α)-quantile of Λ
i
t0 given Rt0−t.
Step 2: Run separate l1-penalized quantile regressions for λit0(c1) and λ
i
t0(c2) from step 1
and obtain






























2 and loss function ρq(u) = u(q − I(u < 0)),
where the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and zero otherwise.
Step 3: Drop all components in R with absolute marginal effects |ξ̃ it0(c)| below a threshold
τ = 0.0001 keeping only the Kit0(c) remaining relevant regressors R(i,t0)(c) for c ∈
{c1, c2}. As c1 > c2, the sets of selected relevant regressors are nested R(i,t0)(c1) ⊆
R(i,t0)(c2) = {R(i,t0)(c1), R(i,t0)(c2\c1)}. If R(i,t0)(c2\c1) is the empty set, restart
Step 2 with λi(c2) and λi(c3) from Step 1. Otherwise re-estimate (3.2.2) without
penalty term for the larger model c2 only with the respective selected relevant uncen-
tered regressors R(i,t0)(c2) and an intercept. This regression yields the post-LASSO
estimates ξ̂ it0q (c2). Apply an F-test for joint significance of regressors R(i,t0)(c2\c1)
at 5% level. If they are significant, restart Step 2 with λi(c2) and λi(c3) from Step
1b. Continue until additional regressors R(i,t0)(cl+1\cl) from penalty cl to cl+1 are
no longer found to be significant. Then the final model is obtained from cl yielding
the set of relevant regressors R(i,t0)(c2) with corresponding post-LASSO estimates
ξ̂ it0q (cl) for the coefficients.
3.2.2 Forecasting Systemic Impact
In an interconnected financial system, we measure the systemic impact of a specific bank
i as the total realized effect of its riskiness on distress of the entire financial system given











comprises tail risks of all other banks in the system selected as relevant
risk drivers for bank i in the corresponding network topology. The marginal effect βs|i,t of
the risk of company i might vary linearly over time in selected firm-specific balance sheet
characteristics Zi∗t−1. Coefficients in (3.2.3) can be obtained via standard quantile regression
analogously to (3.2.2) without penalty term. Corresponding to the one-year estimation win-
dow for the time-varying network, we also determine parameters in (3.2.3) at the beginning
of each quarter, based on observations dating back no longer than one year. The systemic
relevance of a company can then be predicted from the beginning of a quarter t0 to the next














for any time point t0 ≤ t ≤ t + τ̃.
3.3 Data and Results
3.3.1 Data
Our sample of financial firms comprises 20 European banks and insurance companies. A
list can be found in Table 3.A.1. The dataset covers Europe-based banks deemed as sys-
temically relevant by Financial Stability Board (2011), for which complete data sets over
the considered period are available.1 It includes the ten largest European banks by assets
in 2010. Furthermore, six insurance companies are selected, all belonging (by assets) to
the top 10 insurers in the world in 2010. The regressors explaining the individual Value
at Risk (VaRi) are selected among other companies’ loss exceedances, individual balance
sheet ratios, and several financial indicators, including country-specific variables.
From quarterly balance sheets obtained from Datastream/Worldscope, three key ratios
are calculated: Leverage, correponding to total assets divided by total equity; maturity mis-
match, the quotient of short-term debt and total debt; and size, defined as the logarithm
of total assets. Furthermore, we include quarterly stock price volatility in the set of pos-
1Banco Espirito Santo is the only bank which is not listed by the Financial Stability Board. We
include it because otherwise, financial firms from Southern Europe would be underrepresented.
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sible regressors, which is estimated over the time span between quarterly reports. Instead
of interpolating the data to daily values, we keep them constant until new information is
published.2
The set of financial indicator variables contains the return on EuroStoxx 600, relative
changes of the volatility index VStoxx, and returns on three major bond indices for Eu-
rope: IBOXX Sovereign, containing government bonds, iBOXX Subsovereigns, consisting
of bonds issued by government owned banks, supranationals and other sub-sovereigns, and
iBOXX Corporates. Furthermore, we include changes in three months Euribor, the inter-
bank lending interest rate, and a liquidity spread between three months Eurepo, the average
repo rate reflecting the cost of repurchase agreements, and the three month Bubill (German
government bond rate) as proxy for the risk free rate. To capture aggregate credit quality in
Europe, we also add the change in the one year and five year default probability indices from
Fitch as well as the change in the five year continued series of the credit default swap index
iTraxx Europe. Another two relevant economic indicators are the gold price and relative
changes of the MSCI Europe Real Estate Price Index.
As proxies for the market’s expectations on economic growth and to capture country-
specific effects on individual VaRs, we include several ten year government bond yields
(Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, United States, and Greece) as well as yield spreads
(ten years minus three months yields) of German and U.S. government bonds. Finally,
accounting for the global interconnectedness of financial markets, we include returns on
financial sector indices, FTSE Financials Japan, Asia, and US.
When estimating systemic risk betas in the second stage, a subset of the above macro
financial indicators is required as control variables. Here, we take the changes in the Eu-
roStoxx 600 index, VStoxx, Euribor, iTraXX, the three FTSE Financial indices, the real
estate index, and the spread between Eurepo and the Bubill rate.
3.3.2 Results
Time-varying tail risk networks
Having identified the tail risk drivers for each firm allows us constructing a tail risk network.
Following Chapter 2, we take all firms as nodes in a network and identify a network link
from firm i to firm j whenever the loss exceedance of i is selected as a tail risk driver for
j. Figures 3.A.1 to 3.A.3 show the resulting systemic risk networks for the 20 financial
institutions computed based on one-year rolling windows from 2006 to 2010. In order
2For simplicity, we assume that quarterly balance sheets become public information on fixed
dates: March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31.
85
to illustrate cross-country and inter-country risk channels, we order the institutions in the
graph according to their (main) home countries.
We identify several risk connections which are quite stable over time and seem to be
fundamental risk channels of the European financial network during the period under con-
sideration. An interesting tail risk connection is the link between Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS) and Barclays. RBS was strongly affected by the break-down of the U.S. housing
and credit markets and realized substantial write-downs in April 2008. In the beginning of
2009, RBS faced a record loss and was bailed out by the UK government which increased
its stake in the company to 70 percent. Conversely, Barclays was relatively well funded un-
til beginning of 2008 and even explored options to take over the defaulting U.S. investment
bank Lehman Brothers. A further bolstering of Barclays’ balance sheet was due to the raise
of new capital by investors in fall 2008. Consequently, Barclays was less exposed to credit
crunches and did not participate in the government’s insurance schemes for toxic assets.
The network analysis, however, reveals that both banks have been deeply connected. Being
bi-directional before the crisis, the links became particularly pronounced and rather one-
directional during the financial crisis. In particular, RBS received substantial tail risk from
Barclays further increasing RBS’s potential losses and making both companies systemi-
cally risky. Interestingly, the strong risk connection between Barclays and RBS vanishes in
the aftermath of the financial crisis which might be a result of RBS’s bailout and ongoing
re-structuring in both banks.
Persistent risk connections are also identified between Deutsche Bank and various big
insurance companies, particularly Allianz as well as between Deutsche Bank and Com-
merzbank. The latter faced significant distress due to investments in toxic assets originating
from the U.S. housing market, and was the first commercial lender in Germany accepting
capital injections from the government. In the beginning of 2009, Commerzbank was partly
nationalised with the government taking a 25% stake. Our analysis reflects that the distress
of Commerzbank also spilled over to Deutsche Bank and thus in turn to big insurances such
as Allianz and Münchener Rück. Hence, governmental support of Commerzbank was an
important step to reduce its systemic risk contribution. This is empirically confirmed by
our analysis as we observe a declining tail risk connectedness of Commerzbank after the
bailout.
Furthermore, the networks reveal persistent connections between UBS and Credit Su-
isse, UBS and Crédit Agricole, Agricole and Société Générale as well as Credit Suisse and
Agricole. The strong interconnections between these Swiss and French banks are likely to
be driven by exposure to the same toxic assets and resulting liquidity shortages stemming
from the U.S. market making these banks facing common funding problems. This hap-
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pened during 2008/09, where all of these banks also received substantial tail risk spillovers
from other competitors. For instance, our analysis reveals that Credit Suisse was subject to
tail risk inflow from Barclays and BNP Paribas which - according to the identified network
connections - spilled over to the ’risk neighbors’ of Credit Suisse. All of these banks re-
ceived bailout packages from the Swiss and French government, respectively. As a possible
consequence of these bailouts and a relaxation of the bank’s funding situation in the after-
math, Credit Suisse’s sensitivity to tail risk inflow from Barclays and BNP Paribas actually
declined in 2009. Likewise, the Spanish bank Santander and the Portugese bank Banco Es-
pirito Santo appear to be deeply interconnected. As discussed below, Santander serves as an
originator and transmitter of systemic risk to various other companies. These dependencies
become particularly visible and pronounced during and after the financial crisis and might
have contributed to the instability and distress of the Spanish banking system in 2012.
Hence, though all these institutions operate on a global level, we still observe a sub-
stantial extent of persistent country-specific risk channels. These effects reflect a strong in-
terconnectedness and consequently inherent instability of national banking systems. These
within-country dependencies are complemented by cross-country linkages and industry-
specific channels. Examples for the latter are tail risk connections prevailing within the
insurance sector including Allianz, AXA, Aviva, Münchener Rück and Aegon. Their inter-
connectedness even increased during the financial crisis, causing a substantial threat for the
system in case of the default of one of these companies.
Our approach, however, also captures interesting time variations in tail risk channels.
In particular, in 2008/09, we observe high fluctuations of network connections. Several risk
channels identified in this period seem to be rather caused by crisis-specific turbulences
and consequently vanished in the aftermath. Examples are connections from Santander
to HSBC, BNP Paribas, Allianz and AXA. These links make Santander systemically quite
risky as the bank obviously produced and transmitted tail risk to various major players in the
system. These findings are confirmed by the estimated systemic risk betas shown below. A
further example is a strong connection between ING and Aviva which built up and increased
through the crisis and vanished thereafter. The Dutch bank ING realized significant losses,
had to cut jobs in 2009 and received capital injections from the Dutch government. Hence,
our analysis shows that substantial tail risk from ING was spreading out to Aviva and in
turn to other insurances.
Analyzing the pure number of outgoing tail risk connections (illustrated by the size of
nodes in the network graphs), we identify Barclays, Santander, AXA, BNP Paribas, ING,
Société Générale and Crédit Agricole as biggest risk transmitters within our sample. Ac-
tually, the latter four were companies which have been bailed out by their governments
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and got partly nationalized. Our analysis indicates that these governmental capital injec-
tions were indeed justifiable as these companies have been (and still are) in the core of the
network and therefore serve as distributors and multipliers of systemic risk. According to
the identified network connections, failure of one of these institutions would substantially
threaten the stability of the financial system.
Systemic risk rankings
Table 3.A.2 reports systemic risk rankings for all quarters between the beginning of 2007
and the end of 2010. They are based on realized systemic risk betas at the end of the
respective foregoing quarter, and therefore contain forecasts of relative systemic relevance.
Prior to the estimation, we conducted a test on joint significance of VaRi and its interaction
with Zi∗, i = 1, ...20, for VaRs, using all five years of data. Apart from two exceptions,
all individual VaRs turn out to be statistically significant for the system’s VaR. The two
exceptions are, on the one hand, Banco Espirito Santo, which is the largest bank in Portugal,
but much less internationally active than the other banks in our sample. On the other hand,
Société Generale is found to be insignificant. We attribute this finding to the fact that in
2008, the bank was affected by large losses induced by the unauthorized propriety trading
of one of its employees. This was a materialization of (idiosyncratic) operational risk, and
may have distorted the test results concerning systemic relevance. We expect that on a
longer horizon, Société Generale’ systemic risk beta would be significant. In the following,
however, we exclude it from the systemic risk rankings, together with Banco Espirito Santo.
It should be noted, that often differences in beta estimates between direct neighboring
firms in the obtained rankings are small and thus not statistically significant. Hence, order-
ings in Table 3.A.2 should rather be seen as an indication for a company’s relative systemic
importance characterizing groups of similar relative systemic impact.3 Figure 3.A.5 illus-
trates the time-varying cross-sectional distribution of the estimated betas. We observe the
overall highest systemic risk betas during the height of the financial crisis. Furthermore, rep-
resentatively for other firms, we depict the estimated systemic impacts of Barclays, Crédit
Agricole, Santander and UBS. It turns out that the respective systemic risk betas move in
locksteps before mid 2008, but strongly diverge during the crisis. Similar relationships are
also shown for other companies and reflect distinct crisis-specific effects.
These effects are supported by Table 3.A.2, revealing strong variations of the relative
systemic riskiness during the crisis. This is obviously induced by a severe instability of the
3At some time points, estimated systemic risk betas become negative. We interpret this finding
as negligible systemic impacts of the respective firm in the respective quarter and therefore omit it
in the ranking.
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financial system during this period and is also confirmed by the high variability of network
connections as discussed above. Conversely, a higher stability of systemic risk patterns over
time is observed in the periods before and after the financial crisis (i.e., 2007 and 2010).
Overall, we identify BNP Paribas, HSBC and Santander as being most risky with the
highest realized risk betas between 2007 and 2010. BNP Paribas was strongly affected
by the credit crunch and an evaporation of liquidity in the funding market. At the end of
2008, the French government agreed to provide financial support Europe’s largest bank.
Our findings reflect that after the bailout, BNP’s systemic riskiness was still comparably
high. According to the network analysis above, this is obviously due its strong intercon-
nectedness making BNP to one of the major originators of tail risk spillovers in 2010. In
contrast, HSBC’s connectedness is only moderate. However, its size and the identified tail
risk connections to Barclays, BNP and Santander make it systemically quite risky. These
connections became obviously quite relevant due to HSBC’s heavy exposure to U.S. hous-
ing and credit markets. Consequently, the bank’s distress induced by significant losses
during the crisis have been spread out in the system resulting in a particularly high sys-
temic riskiness around beginning of 2009. This is backed by the fact that HSBC had to
cut a substantial amount of jobs at beginning of 2009. Our results indicate that also in the
aftermath of the crisis, HSBC still remains systemically quite risky. In case of Santander,
the relative systemic riskiness (compared to other banks) even tends to increase after the
financial crisis (particularly in 2010). This finding might already indicate funding problems
in the Spanish banking market becoming particularly evident in 2012. These results are
in line with the findings of the network analysis above identifying Santander as a deeply
interconnected bank being linked to several insurance companies and (particularly during
the crisis) to other major players like Barclays and HSBC.
Monitoring systemic risk rankings over the course of the financial crisis provides inter-
esting insights into the systemic importance of individual firms under extreme conditions of
market distress. Four prominent examples are RBS, Barclays, Deutsche Bank and HBSC.
According to the estimated systemic risk betas, we classify RBS as belonging to the most
systemically risky companies in 2008. Also Barclays is identified as being systemically
very relevant in several (though not all) periods in 2008/09. The identified network con-
nections revealed that the strong connection between Barclays and RBS was obviously one
driving force of the systemic relevance of both. This is also confirmed by the fact that
the systemic relevance of both (as indicated by the realized betas) declined as the tail risk
connection between both vanishes in 2009. Likewise, Deutsche Bank faces a steady in-
crease of its systemic relevance in 2007 and belongs to the group of systemically most risky
companies in 2008. This is confirmed by the network analysis above showing that particu-
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larly during 2008, Deutsche Bank was deeply interconnected with risk channels to various
major insurance companies. Consequently, a default of Deutsche Bank would have had
dramatic consequences for the insurance industry and thus the stability of the entire sys-
tem. Although Deutsche Bank was not subject to any government bailouts it went through
a process of substantial internal restructuring. This is confirmed by our estimates showing
a decline of Deutsche Bank’s systemic importance during 2009 and 2010.
Finally, for the post-crisis period, we observe a tendency for the insurance companies
becoming relatively more risky. Particularly in 2010, Allianz, Aviva, Axa, Generali and
Münchener Rück reveal relatively high (though not always significant) systemic risk betas.
Likewise, also Société Générale and Credit Suisse are identified as systemically risky in
2010. These findings are confirmed by the network analysis showing a comparably high
connectedness of Société Générale, Axa and Generali.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a framework for forecasting financial institutions’ marginal con-
tribution to systemic risk based on their interconnectedness in terms of extreme downside
risks. There are four major challenges in this context: Firms’ (conditional) tail risks are
unobserved and must be estimated from data. Determining such individual risk levels ap-
propriately results in high-dimensional models due to the large number of potential net-
work connections. These network dependencies, however, are inherently instable over time.
Therefore forecasting stability and responsiveness require careful balancing. To tackle these
issues, we adapt the two-stage quantile regression approach introduced in Chapter 2 to a
rolling window out-of-sample prediction setting based on time-varying networks.
In a sample of large European banks covering the period 2007 to 2010, the adapted pro-
cedure reveals the dynamic nature of interconnectedness and corresponding risk channels in
the European financial system around and during the financial crisis. The time evolution of
network dependencies provides valuable insights into a bank’s role in the system identifying
originators and transmitters of tail risk over time. Determined relevant tail risk connections
and systemic risk rankings both provide valuable input for regulation. Given the need for
better and more timely market surveillance, our approach can thus serve as a useful vehicle
for providing a continuous assessment of systemic risk dependencies based on market data.
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3.A Appendix
Aegon (Insurance, NL) Deutsche Bank (Bank, DE)
Allianz (Insurance, DE) Generali (Insurance, IT)
Aviva (Insurance, UK) HSBC (Bank, UK)
AXA (Insurance, FR) ING Groep (Bank, NL)
Banco Espirito Santo (Bank, PT) Lloyds Banking Group (UK)
Barclays (Bank, UK) Muenchener Rueck (Insurance, DE)
BNP Paribas (Bank, FR) Royal Bank of Scotland (Bank, UK)
Commerzbank (Insurance, DE) Santander (Bank, ES)
Crédit Agricole (Bank, FR) Société Générale (Bank, FR)
Credit Suisse (Bank, CH) UBS (Bank, CH)
Table 3.A.1: List of included European financial institutions. As most of them provide a
broad range of services, we differentiate between banks and insurance companies according
to their main field of business activities. Furthermore, we state the country their headquar-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A.2: Systemic risk rankings for 2007 - 2010, based on quarterly realized beta fore-
casts β̃s|i · 100, see equation (3.2.4).4
rank name forecast rank name forecast
Q1.2007 Q2.2007
1 Aegon 0.7667 1 BNP Paribas 1.0964
2 Commerzbank 0.6495 2 UBS 0.434
3 Generali 0.5392 3 Aviva 0.3012
4 Credit Agricole 0.5077 4 Commerzbank 0.276
5 Barclays 0.3703 5 Deutsche Bank 0.2436
6 HSBC 0.3611 6 AXA 0.2324
7 Allianz 0.3492 7 Aegon 0.2095
8 BNP Paribas 0.3016 8 Muenchener Rueck 0.1625
9 Lloyds 0.2887 9 Allianz 0.1252
10 AXA 0.2453 10 ING 0.0914
11 Aviva 0.1888 11 Credit Suisse 0.0865
12 ING 0.163 12 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.051
13 Deutsche Bank 0.1379 13 Santander 0.0393
14 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0556 14 Barclays 0.0067
Q3.2007 Q4.2007
1 UBS 0.4234 1 Deutsche Bank 0.71
2 HSBC 0.3127 2 Aviva 0.5619
3 Deutsche Bank 0.3068 3 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.5504
4 Credit Suisse 0.2296 4 Credit Agricole 0.4205
5 Generali 0.2087 5 BNP Paribas 0.3934
6 Santander 0.1947 6 Credit Suisse 0.3529
7 Barclays 0.1663 7 AXA 0.3306
8 AXA 0.1425 8 HSBC 0.3203
9 ING 0.1203 9 ING 0.3126
10 Credit Agricole 0.1007 10 Aegon 0.3104
11 Commerzbank 0.0681 11 Muenchener Rueck 0.1954






1 BNP Paribas 0.5472 1 AXA 0.9152
2 Barclays 0.487 2 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.8259
3 Santander 0.4507 3 Muenchener Rueck 0.7661
4 Commerzbank 0.4375 4 Lloyds 0.5474
5 Deutsche Bank 0.3819 5 Generali 0.543
6 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.3783 6 Credit Agricole 0.5294
7 Credit Suisse 0.3508 7 BNP Paribas 0.5003
8 AXA 0.2114 8 Deutsche Bank 0.4948
9 Credit Agricole 0.1429 9 HSBC 0.4339
10 Muenchener Rueck 0.1351 10 Commerzbank 0.35
11 Allianz 0.1281 11 Aegon 0.2153
12 Lloyds 0.1148 12 Aviva 0.201
13 Aviva 0.071 13 Barclays 0.1925
14 Aegon 0.0255 14 Santander 0.1582




1 Santander 1.07 1 HSBC 1.4631
2 Barclays 0.7768 2 Deutsche Bank 0.6341
3 Aviva 0.4461 3 Santander 0.5148
4 Credit Suisse 0.4029 4 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.4998
5 Generali 0.349 5 BNP Paribas 0.3873
6 Muenchener Rueck 0.2384 6 UBS 0.346
7 Deutsche Bank 0.2113 7 Generali 0.3118
8 HSBC 0.1727 8 Muenchener Rueck 0.2926
9 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.167 9 Lloyds 0.0985
10 ING 0.1566
11 BNP Paribas 0.0598
Continued on next page
4Avoiding multicollinearity, we include in Zi∗ only the one component of Zi which exhibits the
lowest correlation with VaRi in the respective interaction term in (3.2.3).
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rank name forecast rank name forecast
Q1.2009 Q2.2009
1 Aegon 2.1546 1 Aegon 2.0523
2 Barclays 1.7557 2 ING 1.4088
3 AXA 1.5601 3 Lloyds 1.3672
4 Aviva 1.5562 4 BNP Paribas 1.3462
5 Allianz 1.3241 5 Santander 1.3259
6 BNP Paribas 0.8262 6 Barclays 1.031
7 Credit Agricole 0.7485 7 Aviva 0.9001
8 HSBC 0.6697 8 HSBC 0.732
9 Santander 0.5945 9 Credit Agricole 0.7251
10 UBS 0.5514 10 Credit Suisse 0.4722
11 Commerzbank 0.2947 11 Muenchener Rueck 0.4417
12 Generali 0.2347 12 Allianz 0.4111
13 Credit Suisse 0.1561 13 AXA 0.2842
14 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.068 14 UBS 0.1028
15 ING 0.0455 15 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0619
Q3.2009 Q4.2009
1 Commerzbank 1.1065 1 Santander 1.0097
2 Aviva 1.0086 2 Credit Agricole 0.9243
3 ING 0.8852 3 HSBC 0.8437
4 AXA 0.8303 4 BNP Paribas 0.6894
5 Lloyds 0.7041 5 Allianz 0.6225
6 BNP Paribas 0.6744 6 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.6093
7 Santander 0.6615 7 Barclays 0.5571
8 Credit Suisse 0.568 8 Lloyds 0.4588
9 Aegon 0.3393 9 ING 0.3702
10 HSBC 0.284 10 Deutsche Bank 0.3661
11 Credit Agricole 0.1044 11 AXA 0.1541
12 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0325 12 Generali 0.0858
13 UBS 0.0276 13 Aviva 0.0699
14 Muenchener Rueck 0.0471
Q1.2010 Q2.2010
1 Credit Suisse 1.058 1 Credit Suisse 0.8629
2 Lloyds 1.0418 2 UBS 0.7561
3 Generali 1.0407 3 ING 0.5004
4 UBS 1.0388 4 Aviva 0.4999
5 Aegon 0.9752 5 Generali 0.4217
6 Allianz 0.7554 6 Santander 0.4
7 AXA 0.7471 7 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.3386
8 BNP Paribas 0.6706 8 Aegon 0.2928
9 Santander 0.5692 9 Deutsche Bank 0.2234
10 Commerzbank 0.5583 10 Allianz 0.2227
11 Aviva 0.5208 11 Muenchener Rueck 0.1033
12 HSBC 0.4992 12 Credit Agricole 0.0703
13 ING 0.4722 13 AXA 0.0384
14 Deutsche Bank 0.4712 14 BNP Paribas 0.016
15 Credit Agricole 0.4019
16 Barclays 0.2284
17 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.1944
Q3.2010 Q4.2010
1 Aviva 0.6092 1 BNP Paribas 1.4491
2 Generali 0.6008 2 Generali 0.503
3 HSBC 0.4951 3 Muenchener Rueck 0.4914
4 Santander 0.4588 4 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.4371
5 Credit Suisse 0.4493 5 Santander 0.3784
6 Muenchener Rueck 0.261 6 Aviva 0.3737
7 Aegon 0.2226 7 Allianz 0.3589
8 UBS 0.151 8 ING 0.3017
9 Credit Agricole 0.1475 9 AXA 0.2553
10 ING 0.1452 10 UBS 0.1886
11 AXA 0.1233 11 Commerzbank 0.1858
12 Allianz 0.1148 12 Aegon 0.1367
13 Commerzbank 0.0935 13 Credit Agricole 0.0334
14 BNP Paribas 0.0554
15 Lloyds 0.0426
16 Barclays 0.0345
17 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.0222
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